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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Personal Injury-Intent to Injure Is Not a
Prerequisite to Recovery for Police Abuse Under Section 1983
Plaintiff, a black youth, brought suit in federal court against
defendant police officer under section 1983 of Title 42, United States
Code,' for deprivation of his constitutional rights and for assault and
battery under a pendent state claim. Plaintiff's claims arose out of an
incident following a chase 2 in which plaintiff, while unarmed and
offering no resistance, was shot by defendant. Plaintiff contended that
the shooting had been intentional and thus constituted a deprivation of
his constitutional right to be free from arbitrary abuse at the hands of
police.3 Defendant maintained that his gun had discharged accidentally
and that there had been no act, redressible under section 1983, depriving
plaintiff of a federally secured right. The trial court found that the
shooting was the result of "gross" or "culpable" negligence and
allowed recovery on the state claim 4 but denied the federal claim on the
ground that recovery under section 1983 was not available for
unintentional injuries. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, held, reversed. 5 Once a deprivation of constitutional rights
resulting from police abuse has been established, no showing of specific
intent is required for recovery under section 1983. Jenkins v. A verett, 424
F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
I. 42 US.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. Although the circumstances of the chase preceding the shooting could have constituted
part of plaintiff's assault and constitutional claims, -[t]he prior pursuit of [plaintiff was] not
pleaded as in itself tortious conduct." Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970). The
circumstances of the chase preceding the shooting, however, influenced the majority's decision. See
note 25 infra and accompanying text.
3. The precise constitutional grounds of plaintiff's claim are not apparent for the court's
opinion, but the majority bases its conclusion on both the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See
note 24 infra.
4. Both the trial court and the appeals court allowed recovery on the state claim for assault
and battery, despite the fact that intent is normally an essential element of these torts. W. PROSSER,
TORTS 35, 40 (3d ed. 1964). In allowing recovery, the courts purported to apply a North Carolina
rule that permits intent to be imputed from gross or culpable negligence. This rule, however, has
apparently been applied by the North Carolina courts only in cases of criminal assault and battery.
The cases relied on in the instant decision were criminal cases.
5. The court affirmed the lower court holding as to liability on the state claim (see note 4
supra),but ruled that the damages awarded on that claim were inadequate.
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Section 1983, originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871,6 established in broad language a civil remedy against every
person who, while acting "under color of" state law, causes another
person to be deprived of any of his federally secured rights.7 The strength

of the section as a private remedy against police abuse' was quickly
emasculated, however, by the restrictive judicial construction of the

language "under color of" state law to encompass only actions taken in
pursuance of state law.9 Consequently, for more than half a century

section 1983 was infrequently litigated with only nominal success.' 0 In
1945, however, the Supreme Court injected new vitality into the statute

through its holding in Screws v. United States" in which the Court
construed the criminal analogue 2 of section 1983 and held that "under
color of" law meant under "pretense" of law. 13 Although the Screws
decision did not involve section 1983, lower federal courts quickly
applied the Court's "pretense" construction to actions involving police

abuse under that section . 4 In Monroe v. Pape,5 the Supreme Court held

6. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. This Act was popularly known as the Ku
Klux Act and constituted a major part of the congressional response to the violence, both public and
private, that was plaguing the reconstruction South.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
8. This comment is concerned primarily with the development of § 1983 as a remedy against
police abuse. The statute has, however, served as the vehicle for attacking a broad spectrum of
infringements on constitutional rights. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(malapportionment of representative districts); Uniied States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55
(7th Cir. 1968) (unreasonable delay of prisoner's parole hearing).
9. Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167,212-13 (1961) (dissent of Justice Frankfurter discussing the
historical background of the "pursuance" construction of "under color of" state law). Most of the
reconstruction civil rights legislation was rendered ineffective by restrictive interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment and judicially engrafted limitations in the construction of the statutes. For a
general discussion of the early treatment of reconstruction legislation see Gressman, The Unhappy
History ofCivil Rights Legislation,50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1336-43 (1952). The early development
of § 1983 is discussed in detail in Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate
FederalCivil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951).
10. Initsfirst50years § 1983 appears to have been litigated only 21 times. Comment, supra
note 9, at 363. In many of these cases the courts reached remarkably harsh results. E.g., Brawner v.
Irwin, 169 F. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (dismissing a Negro woman's complaint against a sheriff
for a publicly administered whipping and a brief imprisonment where no crime was charged).
Some small measure of success was enjoyed, however, in attacks on racially discriminatory voting
statutes. E.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 US. 475 (1903). The success of such actions can be explained in
large part by the fact that they comply with the "under color of" state law requirements.
11. 325 U.S.91 (1945).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940), currently, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
13. 325 U.S. at 111.
14. Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953) (unreasonable search and seizure by
policemen which exceeded their legal authority was under color of law); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d
697 (3d Cir. 1949) (policemen's illegal actions in denying integrated group of plaintiffs access to
public pool was under color of state law).
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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that such an application of the Screws construction to section 1983 was
proper. 6 The Court's opinion in Monroe, however, went beyond the
mere application of Screws to section 1983. In Screws, the Court had
construed the criminal statute to require "a specific intent to deprive a
person of a federal right."17 In Monroe, the Court refused to read a
specific intent requirement into section 1983; instead, it stated that
"[s]ection [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions.""' Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected the contention that
state remedies must be exhausted before recovery is allowed under
section 1983, holding the federal remedy to be supplementary to any
state remedy that might be available. 19 Subsequently, the Court
feiterated its background of tort liability formula in Piersonv. Ray,20 in
which it preserved certain common law defenses for defendants in section
1983 actions. Lower federal courts have exhibited considerable
confusion in complying with the mandate of Monroe to read section
1983 against the background of tort liability. 21 Some courts, apparently
feeling that the section 1983 remedy against police abuse should be
limited in some way, have required a showing of evil motive or shocking
abuse for recovery.2 Other courts, however, have viewed such attempts
to limit section 1983 as inconsistent with the purpose of the statute as a
supplementary remedy that is to be "read against the background of tort
liability ....
""The Supreme Court has thus far refrained from
elaborating on the basis of liability in a section 1983 claim under its
holding in Monroe.
In the instant case the court reviewed the constitutional prohibitions
against excessive police violence and concluded that both the fourth and
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 202.
325 US. at 103.
365 Us.at 187.

19. 365 US. at 183. The Court, in Monroe, specifically enumerated 3 purposes underlying
§ 1983: (1) to override certain kinds of state laws; (2) to provide a remedy where ntate law is
inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, although adequate in
theory, is not available in practice. 365 U.S. at 173-74. The purpose of providing a supplementary

remedy was added, although not enumerated, in the Court's discussion in Monroe. In McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963), however, the Court included the supplementary
remedy purpose as coequal with the enumerated purposes in Monroe.

20. 386 US.547 (1967).
21. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 386 US. 547 (1967) (holding
that defense of reasonable reliance on statute subsequently declared unconstitutional was not
available to policemen under Monroe).
22. E.g., Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F. Supp.
71 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
23. Whirlv. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 787 (5thCir. 1969).
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the fourteenth amendments afford protection against such violence.YA In
its analysis, the court refused to restrict its consideration to the quality
of the single act that resulted in the plaintiff's injury. Rather, it
examined the shooting as merely one event in defendant's overall
conduct as a police officer. Viewed in this fashion, the court found that
while the plaintiff 's injury might not have been specifically intended, "it
was, however, the direct consequence of defendant's wanton conduct in
the course of his attempt to apprehend plaintiff." 5 The court concluded
that the plaintiff had been subjected to the reckless use of excessive force
that resulted in his injury and amounted to a deprivation of his
constitutional rights. Having established the existence of a constitutional
deprivation, the court refused to require any additional element of intent.
Such a requirement, the court reasoned, would be inconsistent with both
the plain language of the statute and with the mandate of Monroe. The
court expressly aligned itself with the group of courts that have refrained
from limiting section 1983 by requiring a showing of evil motive or
outrageous conduct.2
At first glance, the most striking feature of the court's decision is its
conclusion that no specifically intended injury is required for recovery
under section 1983, but such a holding is not unprecedented. z2 More
important than the court's conclusion, however, is the analytical
methodology behind the result. The focus of the court on the character of
the overall circumstances surrounding the deprivation, rather than on
the peculiar nature of the individual injurious event abstracted from its
context, represents an important extension of the Supreme Court's
holding in Monroe. The Court in that decision posited tort liability as
the model against which section 1983 claims should be measured. While
constitutional claims for police abuse almost invariably involve a
parallel tort injury, there may be fundamental differences in the quality
24. Since the Court's decision in Screws, complaints of physical abuse at the hands of police
have been frequently upheld. The constitutional protection against such abuse, in fact, seems
occasionally to be taken for granted. See Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) (court
apparently assumed the constitutional protection against physical abuse); MeCollum v. Mayfield,
130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (court cites defendant's memorandum as accepting the
constitutional protection against physical abuse).

25. 424 F.2d at 1232. The dissenting opinion refused to adopt the majority's analysis.
Instead, the dissent focused on the shooting alone and concluded that negligence, regardless of how
aggravated cannot be used as the basis of recovery under § 1983. The dissent criticized the
majority decision for opening the door to a constitutional claim every time a public official is
negligent. 424 F.2d at 1234.
26. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
27. In a recent case, in the Fifth Circuit, the court refused to consider the question of actual

fault or negligence where a prisoner was not released for 9 months subsequent to the issuance of a
release order. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
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of fault underlying the two actions. Thus, a series of "routine" actions
taken by police, none of which are tortious in themselves, might evince
an overall design of police harassment or abuse. By applying the
analytical approach used by the court in the instant case, such difficult
problems of constitutional fault can be realistically evaluated without
depriving policemen of their legitimate defenses of probable cause,
reasonable reliahce, and accident.
The instant case does little to answer the criticism generated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Monroe. This criticism has been based on
the three generally distinct grounds that the easing of the requirements
for recovery under section 1983 will: (1) clog the federal courts with a
flood of trivial litigation; 2s (2) produce an unwarranted offensive use of
constitutional principles that have developed as defensive safeguards;2
and (3) inject the federal courts into the area of local police regulation
and thereby upset the balance of authority in the federal-state
relationship.3 Although these criticisms have some merit, they do not
appear to be particularly susceptible to a definitive judicial solution.
While efficient administration is a valid policy concern of the courts, a
judicial method of decreasing the volume of section 1983 litigation
without affecting the practical availability of a remedy to legitimate
claimants does not appear to be in the offing.3 1 Similarly, the essentially
defensive nature of constitutional safeguards is admitted, but these
safeguards define rights that are occasionally infringed, and section 1983
makes these infringements actionable. As constitutional issues are raised
under section 1983, it seems more desirable to decide them on a case-bycase basis than to attempt to establish any final, all-encompassing rule
of constitutional fault. Finally, the criticism that section 1983 claims
inject the federal courts into essentially local regulatory matters and
disrupt the federal-state relationship must be balanced against the
28. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1486, 1493 (1969).
29. Comment, Tort Liability of Law Enforcement Officers Under Section 1983 of the Civil
RightsAct,30 LA. L. REv. 100, 114-15 (1969).
30. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape.and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U.L.

REv. 277,324 (1965).
31. The supplementary remedy purpose of § 1983 has been blamed for the volume of
litigation. A modified version of the old exhaustion of state remedies limitation has been suggested
as a solution. See Note, supra note 28. Implicit in this solution, however, is the questionable
assumption that state courts and administrative agencies will serve adequately as impartial
tribunals, properly sensitive to the delicacy of constitutional issues. Furthermore, it must be
recognized that such a limitation would probably result in a large number of legitimate claims being
suffocated by lengthy adjudication; and presumably this is precisely the evil that the solution seeks
to avoid. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1352 (1970).
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legitimate federal interest in protecting the constitutional rights of
citizens. The failure of the instant case to answer the critics of Monroe
seems to rest primarily in the fact that the criticism is not judicially
answerable. Any restrictions on the availability or scope of the remedy
under section 1983 should be made by the Congress. In the absence of
legislative action, the instant case affords a significant analytical method
for evaluating fault in claims under section 1983.

Constitutional Law-Abortion--Statute Prohibiting Abortion of
Unquickened Fetus Violates Mother's Constitutional Right of

Privacy
Plaintiff, a physician charged with illegally aborting the life of an

unquickened fetus,' filed a petition in federal district court seeking to
enjoin his prosecution and requesting a declaratory judgment that the
Wisconsin abortion statute2 is unconstitutional. Plaintiff contended
chiefly3 that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the private
right of a woman to refuse to carry an unquickened embryo. The State
asserted that the statute is justified as protecting society's interest in
regulating abortion.4 A temporary restraining order was denied by a

single-judge district court, and a three-judge panel convened to consider
the constitutional issues presented.5 The United States District Court for
I. The period of the unquickened fetus runs from conception to the sixteenth or eighteenth
week of pregnancy. Quickening is marked by interuterine movements of the fetus perceived by the
mother. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1340-41 (21st ed. 1966).
2. "(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an unborn
child may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both ...
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
(a) Is performed by a physician; and
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life of
the mother, and
(c). Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital."
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958). The indictment charged plaintiff with performing an illegal
abortion of an unquickened fetus when the operation was not necessary to save the life of the
mother.
3. Plaintiff also contended that the phrase "necessary. . .to save the life of the mother" is
vague and that the statute denies equal protection of the law.
4. The State maintained that its interest in regulating abortion includes the protection of the
life of the fetus, preservation of the health of the mother, and discouragement of illicit sexual
relations.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), provides for a 3-judge federal panel when an injunction is sought
to restrain a state officer from enforcing a state statute on the ground that it is repugnant to the
Constitution.
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the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied injunctive relief,, but, held,
judgment for plaintiff. A state statute that prohibits abortion of an
unquickened embryo by a-licensed physician violates a woman's basic
right of privacy secured by the ninth amendment. Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3132

(U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
At common law, the destruction of an unquickened embryo with

permission of the mother was not an indictable offense. 7 State
legislatures, however, began to place legal restrictions on all abortions as
early as 1803 in an effort to protect the woman from hazardous surgical

procedures. 8 Eventually, all states enacted statutes making the abortion
of an unquickened fetus a criminal act, providing exceptions only when
the operation was necessary to preserve the life of the mother.9
Concurrent with the rise of anti-abortion legislation, the Supreme Court

began to recognize the potentially conflicting right of individual privacy.
Although not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, the right of

individual privacy has been recognized through the Court's
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 10 Generally, this personal liberty has

found its most vigorous application when the citizen's home and family
life have been threatened with invasion." In Meyer v. Nebraska,'2 for
example, the Court described the right to marry, establish a home, and

bring up children as an essential liberty. The modern application of this
doctrine has found expression in Griswold v. Connecticut. 3 In

invalidating Connecticut's anti-contraception law, the Court applied the
6. The abstention doctrine denies federal courts the power to enjoin state proceedings unless
authorized specifically by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). The policy is to prevent needless state-federal friction. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U S. 117 (1951).

7. R.

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

140 (2d ed. 1969).

8. Lucas, Federal ConstitutionalLimitations on the Enforcement and Administration of
State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730,732 (1968); Wasmuth, Abortion Laws: The Perplexing Problem, 18 CLay. ST. L. Rev. 503, 504 (1969); see Quay, JustifiableAbortion-Medicaland
Legal Foundations,49 GEO. L. 173 (1960).
9. See Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; TherapeuticAbortion and the
Law; Some New Approaches,27 OHIo ST. LJ. 647,653 (1966); Lucas, supra note 8.
10. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US. 449 (1958) (statute requiring membership lists of
organizations held abridgment of freedom of association); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 US. 622
(1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation held valid protection of residents' right to
privacy); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 US. 250 (1891) (plaintiff cannot be compelled to submit
to physical examination before trial of civil case). But there are considerations of public convenience
which supersede the right of privacy. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 US. 451 (1952) (allowing
commercial broadcasts on public buses against a claim of invasion of privacy).
11. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967) (invalidating antimiscegenation statute);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961) (limiting permissible scope of search under warrant).
12. 262 US.390 (1923).
13. 381 US.479 (1965).
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essential liberty rationale to the marital relationship, declaring that the

penumbra surrounding the first amendment protects family privacy
from state encroachment except on showing of a compelling public
necessity." Recently, legal writers have recognized the similarity between

legislation prohibiting the use of contraceptives and statutes forbidding
abortion of an unquickened embryo,'- and constitutional challenges to
the statutes have appeared. 6 In United States v. Vuitch,' 7 a federal

district court, in invalidating the District of Columbia's abortion statute
recognized that a woman's liberty may well include the right to remove
an unwanted fetus. Similarly, in People v. Belous, 8 the Supreme Court
of California considered the abortion statute's probable invasion of

feminine rights while invalidating California's pre-1967 statute on
grounds of vagueness. No court, however, has been faced solely with the
conflict between a woman's private right to abort an unquickened fetus
and the state's legislative policy surrounding the abortion statutes.

In the instant case, the court initially analyzed recent Supreme
Court decisions that recognize a right of privacy in matters related to
sex, marriage, and family and concluded that a woman's prerogative to
decide whether to carry or reject an unquickened fetus is a fundamental
right secured by the ninth amendment. Recognizing that the sole issue

for decision 9 was whether the state had a sufficiently compelling interest

14. The majority based its decision on the Bill of Rights as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg deemed marital privacy an
essential right reserved to the people by the ninth amendment. Id. at 491. See also Dixon, The
Griswold Penumbra:ConstitutionalCharterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?,64 MIcH. L. REV.
197 (1965).
15. E.g., Lamm, The Reproductive Revolution, 56 A.BAJ. 41, 43 (1970); Lucas, supra
note 8. "[C]ontraception and abortion differ only in degree. . . . Both 'kill' living tissue, but
only in the same sense that oral contraceptives cause the unfertilized egg to die at the end of each
cycle." Id. at 765. See also Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status and Prognosis.21 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 521 (1970).
16. Abortion laws have been challenged as vague, denying due process of law; discriminatory,
denying equal protection; and suppressive, abridging a woman's personal right to control the
reproductive function of her body. Physicians assailing the usual statutes, which condemn all
abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother, contend that the statutes are so vague
that the physician is placed in an unconscionable position. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp.
1032 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal docketed 38 U.S.L.W. 3303 (US. Feb. 5, 1970) (No. 1155); cf.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Additionally, it has been argued that abortion
legislation discriminates against persons in lower economic brackets because illegal abortions or
abortions in foreign countries are readily accessible only to the wealthy. This argument has not been
persuasive. Lucas, supra note 8, at 770.
17. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal docketed, 38 US.L.W. 3303 (US. Feb. 5,
1970) (No. 1155).
-Cal.
3d - 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
18.
(1970).
19. The court brushed aside plaintiff's contention that the statutory language, "necessary
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in regulating abortions to justify infringement of this basic right, 20 the
court expressly excluded from its consideration matters pertaining to
theology and overpopulation. Noting that modern surgical techniques
had virtually eliminated the inherent dangers of medical abortions during early pregnancy, the court found no compelling state interest in
protecting the life of the mother. The court also concluded that the
state's interest in discouraging non-marital sexual relations did not
justify the broad proscription of the statute, which did not distinguish
between married and unmarried women. Finding no sufficiently
compelling interest to justify the restriction on the woman's personal
right, the court held that the right of the woman to refuse to carry an
unquickened embryo outweighed the state's interest in protecting the life
of an embryo of four months or less, thus invalidating the challenged
2
portions of the statute. '
The instant case represents the first time a court has declared an
abortion statute unconstitutional solely on the ground that it invaded the
woman's private right to be free from an unwanted pregnancy. Since
practically all abortions occur before quickening of the fetus,2 the
court's holding greatly diminishes the effectiveness of abortion statutes.
As a result of the instant decision, presumably the only restriction that a
state may place on the mother's right to abort an unquickened fetus is
that the operation be performed by a licensed physician. This determination is in sharp contrast to UnitedStates v. Vuitch,23 which, although
recognizing the woman's interest to be free from an undesired pregnancy, indicated that the state may have sufficient interest to invade
the woman's right after a legislative review of current scientific and
sociological data. The difficulty, therefore, is not in delineating the rights
of the woman, but in determining the weight to be given to the state's
interest in protecting the life, health, and morals of its citizenry.Y
• * . to save the life of the mother," was unduly vague. The court additionally found unpersuasive
plaintiff's argument that the statute discriminates against the poor, violating the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Although the Supreme Court has
recognized the right of privacy, it has also warned that the state may infringe on personal liberties

when they conflict with a compelling state interest.
21.
22.
23.

310 F.Supp. at302.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal docketed, 38 US.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Feb. 5,

1970) (No. 1155).
24. In People v. Belous,
- Cal. 3d _
458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970), the prosecution conceded the constitutional right of a woman to abort
an unwanted pregnancy, but argued that the state had a sufficient interest in protecting the embryo
to invade personal freedom. See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (abortion

1350

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

Although abortion statutes were originally designed to protect the life of

the woman, today these statutes compel an estimated 8,000 to 10,000
women per year to die as a result of unskillful illegal abortions, even

though the medical abortion is a relatively safe surgical procedure.26
Additionally, the state's interest in curbing promiscuity by holding to

scorn the unwed mother ignores the fact that 90 percent of all abortions
are performed on married women and disregards the availability of

modern contraceptive techniques.2Y Since abortion statutes are no longer
thought to protect the health and morality of the expectant mother, the
question becomes the extent of society's interest in insuring the normal

growth and development of a fetus. Advocates of abortion legislation
argue that at common law the embryo, from the moment of conception,

was entitled to receive property by will and through intestacy, be the
beneficiary of a private trust, suffer tortious injury, and be protected by
penal statutes from parental neglect.28 In short, they conclude that since

a child's legal existence begins at the moment of conception, the embryo
is entitled to the full protection of the law.2 It is to be observed, however,

that the fetus may assert the rights he acquires prenatally only by being
born alive, or at least reaching the point of viability.30 Moreover, both
statute held unconstitutional as violating rights secured by the ninth amendment). But see Rosen
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 39 US.L.W. 2126 (E.D. La. Aug. 7, 1970) (refusing to extend the constitutional right of privacy to the mother's right to terminate an undesired
pregnancy).
25. Rough estimates place the American death rate resulting from abortion at approximately
1% of abortions attempted. See Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 88,
91- (1968). This figure should be compared with the death rate of 0.04% in Sweden and an equally
low rate in Japan, both countries permitting medical abortion at the election of the mother. L.
LADER, ABORTION 125-31 (1966); Darby, Abortion, 3 OXFORD LAW. 7, 10 (1960).
26. People v. Belous, -Cal. 3d _
458 P.2d 194,80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 US. 915 (1970); Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 88 (1968).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
28. See, e.g., Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 US. 978 (1964) (requiring prenatal transfusion of infant's blood
over mother's objection); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834) (holding that conceived
embryo could inherit under provision devising to grandchildren living at testator's death); In re
Holthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (a child en ventresa mere is
born and alive for all purposes for his benefit); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d
288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962) (infant may recover for injuries sustained prenatally); Noonan, The
Constitutionalityof the Regulation ofAbortion, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 51,59 (1969).
29. Noonan, supra note 28; Tinnelly, Aborton and Penal Law. 5 CATHOLIC LAW, 187
(1959).
30. In the law of property, a fetus may take by descent and distribution only if born alive, and
if it is never born, it has not and cannot have an estate from which others may take. E.g., In re
Scanelli, 208 Misc. 804, 142 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Lee's Will, 203 Misc. 165, 116
N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sur. Ct. 1952); see Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47,202 A.2d 9 (1964). Tort law often
allows the administrator of a stillborn fetus to bring an action of wrongful death against the
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modern statutes and early common law recognize that when the interests
of the mother and fetus conflict, the former prevail.31 Clearly then, the
legal status of the embryo is at best ambiguous. The American Law

Institute has determined that objections to abortion reform are not
primarily grounded on legal considerations, but rather on religious be-

liefs32which deem abortion sinful because it cheapens the value of human
life.

It is submitted, however, that this consideration alone is not a

sufficiently compelling interest to justify the state in imposing the ideals
of particular religious groups on society at large.3 The absence of a
compelling state interest in the restriction of abortion has recently been

reflectedas three states, Alaska, Hawaii, and New York, have abolished
their abortion restrictions3 4 and six others have enacted liberal
therapeutic abortion statutes.M In addition, the Department of Defense,
state law notwithstanding, now permits abortions to be performed on
service personnel and their dependents whenever deemed medically
expedient.3 6 These new developments aimed at facilitating and regulating
tortfeasor who injured the fetus in the womb. It is usually held, however, that the fetus must have
been viable--capable of maintaining independent life-at the time of the injury. Panagopoulous v.
Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969) ("person" in wrongful death statute includes the
viable fetus); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (Super. Ct. 1966)
(administrator of stillborn viable fetus can maintain action of wrongful death). But see Hogan v.
McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958) ("person" within meaning of wrongful death
statute does not include viable fetus). To further confuse the legal status of the embryo, common law
and statutory law differentiate between the destruction of a quickened and unquickened fetus,
usually providing less severe penalties for destruction of an unquickened fetus. R. PERKINS, supra
note 7.
31. All 50 states and the District of Columbia permit abortion if necessary to save the life of
the mother. See D. GRANFIELD, THE ABORTION DECISION 79 (1969). Additionally, Alabama,
California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, and North Carolina permit abortion if necessary to
preserve the life and health of the mother. Lucas, supra note 8, at 740.
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); see R. SHAW,
ABORTION ON TRIAL 156-91 (1968).
33. It is at least arguable that since states are required to maintain neutrality in their
legislation when dealing with religious matters, the imposition of what is essentially the Roman
Catholic position on society in general violates the religious exercise clause of the first amendment.
Cf Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (indicating that the religious exercise
clause has never meant that a majority may use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs).
See also W. KArz, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 12 (1964); Note, Abortion Law
Reform at a Crossroads?,46 CH.-KENT L. REv. 102 (1969).
34. NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1970, at 60, col. 2; id., Apr. 13, 1970, at 77, col. 3; TIME, Mar. 9,
1970, at 34, col. i.
35. The states include California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, and North
Carolina. Wasmuth, supra note 8, at 506. In addition, the State of Washington, by referendum,
has voted to permit abortions by licensed physicians in accredited hospitals. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
1970, at 38, col. 4.
36. Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 19, 1970, at 2, col. 2. The new AMA policy is that a
physician may perform an abortion after due consideration of the patient's welfare. NEWSWEEK,
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abortion at the election of the mother support the conclusion that, in
reality, the state has no substantial interest in restricting a woman's
right to control the reproductive function of her body.

Constitutional Law-Obscenity-State Statute Allowing
Injunction Against Dissemination of Allegedly Obscene Material
Prior to Adversary Hearing Not Violative of First Amendment
Plaintiff book dealer' sought in federal court a declaratory
judgment that two Tennessee obscenity statutes were unconstitutional
and an injunction that would bar their enforcement.2 The criminal3 and
civil4 obscenity statutes challenged empower state courts to enjoin the
distribution 5 of allegedly obscene materials before any adversary hearing
July 6, 1970, at 60, col. 2. In addition, the President's Task Force on the Mentally Handicapped
has recently recommended the legalization of abortion stating: "In the interest of both maternal
Washington
and child mental health, no woman should be forced to bear an unwanted child.
Post, Oct. 1I, 1970, at 2, col. 6.
1. Plaintiff brought the action as an individual and as the class representative of the book
dealers in Tennessee.
2. Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of all 5 Tennessee obscenity, statutes, TENN. CoDE
ANN. §§ 39-3003 to -3007 (Supp. 1969). Significant constitutional problems were raised in the
challenge to only 2 of these statutes.
3. Tennessee's criminal obscenity statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3003 (Supp. 1969),
provides: "[l]f the district attorney-general is of the opinion that this section is being violated, he
may file a petition in a circuit, chancery, or criminal court of his district relating his opinion, and
request the court to issue a temporary injunction enjoining the person named in said petition from
removing the obscene material from the jurisdiction of the court pending an adversary hearing on
said petition. Where a temporary injunction is so issued, such adversary hearing shall be held within
two (2) days after joinder of issues, at which hearing the court will determine whether or not the
material in question is, in fact, obscene. On a finding of obscenity, the court shall continue its
injunction in full force and effect for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days or until an
indictment on the matter has been submitted to the grand jury. I f forty-five (45) days elapse and the
grand jury has taken no action, the injunction terminates. The injunction also terminates on the
grand jury returning a not true bill. On the return of a true bill of indictment, the court shall order
the obscene material delivered into the hands of the court clerk or district attorney-general, there to
be held as evidence in the case."
4. Tennessee's civil obscenity statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3005 (Supp. 1969), provides:
"The circuit, chancery, and criminal courts of this state have jurisdiction to enjoin the sale or
distribution of obscene material. . . hereinafter specified:
(b). . . where a temporary injunction has been issued, trial shall be held within two (2) days
after joinder of issues and in such instances the court shall render its decision within two (2)
days after the conclusion of the trial.
(d) The review of any final decree shall be by broad appeal direct to the Supreme Court."
5. Tennessee's criminal obscenity statute allows the courts to enjoin the distributor from
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is held on the issue of their obscenity, but require that such a hearing be

held within two days after the complaint is answered. Plaintiff contended
that the procedure does not adequately protect non-obscene speech and
press because it does not require an adversary hearing on the issue of
obscenity before government interference. Furthermore, plaintiff
maintained that the absence of such protection intimidated and
restrained him from freely exercising his rights of speech and press in
violation of the first amendment.6 A three-judge panel for the Middle
District of Tennessee upheld the statutes. 7 State obscenity statutes that
allow an injunction against the dissemination of allegedly obscene

materials prior to an adversary hearing, but that require a hearing
shortly after the complaint is answered, do not violate first amendment
rights. ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn.

1970).
The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States8 ruled that, since the

first amendment does not protect obscene speech or press, the states may
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials. The states may utilize

both criminal and civil proceedings to regulate obscene materials and
may impose any civil or criminal sanctions? Identical constitutional
limitations have been imposed on both types of proceedings to assure

that non-obscene expression will not be suppressed. 10 First, the
requirement that the obscenity of the materials be tested by the liberal

standards developed in Roth and subsequent cases" has limited what can
removing the material from the jurisdiction of the court, but it does not allow the court to prohibit

further dissemination. This remedy can be secured only by an action under Tennessee's civil
obscenity statute. See notes 3-4 supra. Both statutes were attacked because they permitted
interference before an adversary hearing on the obscenity of the material.
6. This contention is based on the doctrine that "prior," or "previous restraint," can violate
first amendment rights just as fully as subsequent punishment.See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931). For a discussion of the distinctions between prior and subsequent restraints on first
amendment rights see Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,4 VAND. L. REv. 533 (1951).
7. A 3-judge district court convened under 28 US.C. § 2281 (1964) has the duty to decide
the merits of a request for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is on its face an
unconstitutional abridgement of protected expression. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 US. 241 (1967).See
generally 34 TENN. L. REv. 235 (1967).
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 1158 (1966). Justices Black and Douglas
dissented in Roth on the grounds that all expression, obscene or otherwise, is protected by the first
amendment. They have maintained their dissent. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US. 51 (1965);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
9. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,441 (1957), citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 US.
141 (1940).
10. See Smith v. California, 361 US. 147 (1959) (holding that a criminal obscenity statute
must include the element of scienter); cf.Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 US. 349 (1951).
11. Whether the criteria in Roth have been changed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
has been the subject of a continuing debate. See United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal.
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be prohibited as obscene. Secondly, the procedural requirement that the2
final decision on the obscenity of the materials be made by a judicial,

rather than administrative, body has assured that the material will be
judged by a relatively impartial body. 13 Thirdly, another procedural

limitation was imposed in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan," in which the
Supreme Court held that the first amendment requires that the obscenity
of material be examined searchingly by the judicial officer before

authorizing any restraint on its dissemination by arrest, seizure, or
injunction. An adversary hearing before restraint satisfies the latter

requirement,'15 but the Supreme Court in dicta in two recent decisions has
taken conflicting positions on the necessity of such a hearing in all
situations. In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,17 the Court condemned a
mass seizure of books before any adversary hearing on their obscenity. It
was further indicated in dicta that any procedure disrupting the

distribution of books and other material prior to an adversary hearing
violates first amendment rights by not adequately protecting nonobscene material. Two federal circuits' have agreed with this position,
although they have declared that the hearing does not have to be a fully
developed action at law but can be any informal proceeding that gives
the affected party an opportunity to be heard. 9 On the other hand, two
circuits 20 have allowed restraint before an adversary hearing, upon a
1970); see, e.g., Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing. 68 MIcu. L. RE!V.
185 (1969); Teeter, Retreatfrom Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 175 (1969);
Note, Obscenity from Stanley to Karalexis: A Back Door Approach to First Amendment
Protection,23 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1970).
12. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying
text.
13. Judges will be more impartial than administrative bodies because: (i) they have longer
tenure and are thus less susceptible to political pressure; (2) they have a wider range of experience
than the expert likely to be chosen for an administrative post. Such an expert is liable to see
obscenity in everything he views. Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv.
518,522-23 (1970). But see text accompanying notes 44-46 infra.
14. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The Court stated that the difference between obscene and
constitutionally protected expression is often separated by a dim line.
15. Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82,90 (3d Cir. 1969).
16. Natali v. Municipal Ct., 309 F. Supp. 192, 197 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
17. 378 US. 205 (1964) (mass seizure of books cannot be made on basis of finding that 7
books under same caption were obscene); accord, Marcus v.Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
18. Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969) (even though magistrate had
viewed film, seizure not justified prior to adversary hearing); Metzger v. Pearey, 393 F.2d 202 (7th
Cir. 1968) (film so seized had to be returned). In the latter case, the court did allow some restraint in
that the exhibitor was ordered to make the film available as an aid in the prosecution.
19. Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639,641 (4th Cir. 1969), citing Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
20. Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1970), citing Bethview
Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Grove
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judicial finding of probable obscenity, when the affected party can secure

a prompt adversary hearing and decision on the merits. These circuits
relied primarily on Freedman v. Maryland,21 in which the Supreme
Court suggested that the availability of a procedure assuring the speedy
termination of governmental interference, upon a finding of nonobscenity, so limited the restraint on first amendment rights that the
procedure was constitutional.2 2 Faced with these inconsistent
declarations from the highest Court and circuits, the district courts have

differed greatly in their interpretations of what procedure must be
followed before suspect materials may be disturbed by seizure, arrest, or

injunction. A majority of district courts have required an adversary
hearing before any seizure of materials,2 but not all have extended this

requirement to an arrest 24 or to a seizure that is made incident to that
arrest.2 A minority of district courts have allowed materials to be seized
before an adversary hearing. All of these courts have permitted an arrest

and incident seizure prior to an adversary hearing.2 1 Some courts
following the minority position have allowed both books and films to be

seized before an adversary hearing,2 while others have allowed some
Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 FId 82 (3d Cir. 1969) (striking down a statute allowing an
injunction before adversary hearing, but suggesting that such a procedure would be constitutional
where a prompt decision on the merits is assured).
21. 380US.51 (1965).
22. Id. at 59.
23. City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 310 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Bongiovanni v.
Hogan, 309 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jodbor Cinema, Ltd. v. Sedita, 309 F. Supp. 868
(W.D.N.Y. 1970); HMH Publishing Co. v. Oldham, 306 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Central
Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v.
Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex. 1969),
appealdismissed,399 U.S. 521 (1970); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
24. In the following decisions, courts did not require an adversary hearing before arrest:
Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); The East Village Other,
Inc. v. Koota, 68 Civ. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Decisions requiring an adversary hearing before arrest
include: Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Sokolic v.
Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969); City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 298 F. Supp. 706 (M.D.
Fla. 1969); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Tnbell, 293 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Cambist Films, Inc. v.
Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. IIl. 1968).
25. Masters v. Russell, 308 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp.
1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969); Natali v. Municipal Ct., 309 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
26. United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1970); Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp.
1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal.),
appeal docketed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1970) (No. 1475); Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F.
Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala.
1969); People v. De Renzy 275 Cal. App. 2d 380,79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1969).
27. Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v.
Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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books to be seized but no films.21 The only case dealing with injunctive
restraint before an adversary hearing has supported the minority

position. 29 This case relied on the landmark five-four decision of

Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,3° in which the Supreme Court held that

an injunctive procedure that required a trial one day after the complaint
was answered and a decision two days after the trial was constitutional.
The Kingsley Books decision has been questioned by some members of

the Court in later decisions .

31

In the instant case, the court agreed that provisions in Tennessee's

obscenity statutes for an injunction prior to an adversary hearing would
intimidate and restrain the plaintiff from freely exercising first
amendment rights in some degree. The court reasoned, however, that the

first amendment does not forbid all prior restraint on the freedom of
speech and press but only unreasonable restraints.3 2 The court found that
restraints in the state obscenity statutes were not unreasonable because a
procedure was available for an expedited hearing and decision on the
legitimacy of the state's interference. Emphasizing that the Supreme

Court in Kingsley Books had upheld a statute almost identical to
Tennessee's civil obscenity statute against similar objections, the court
held that the statutes were constitutional.3
The court in the instant decision joins the minority of district courts
allowing restraint of first amendment materials prior to an adversary
hearing. The court decided that any restraints on first amendment rights
were reasonable because they would be of short duration if the plaintiff
responded promptly to the complaint against him and if the materials
were found not to be obscene in the adversary hearing. Until that
hearing, the civil statute authorizes an injunction barring all sales and
distribution of the materials. The practical consequences of a prehearing injunction for the book dealer and movie exhibitor are no
28. Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1970), citing Bethview
Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969). The reasoning is that a seizure of one film
is likely to be a very great restraint, as the exhibitor will be temporarily out of business if he has no
other copies. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
29. Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969).
30. 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (upholding New York statute authorizing injunction with an
adversary hearing obtainable one day after joinder of issues). The New York courts have
subsequently held that no exparte injunction may be issued under the statute. Tenney v. Liberty
News Distribs., Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 770,215 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1961).
31. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,211 (1964).
32. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,441 (1957).
33. The District Court of Western Tennessee upheld Tennessee's civil obscenity statute in
Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. State, 220 Tenn. 101,414 S.W.2d 638 (1967). This decision
was reversed in 389 U.S. 578 (1968), but the briefper curiam opinion did not make clear whether the
reversal was on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional or that the film was not obscene.
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different from the mass seizure that the Supreme Court has consistently
condemned:3 both completely halt the dissemination of the materials.
Such complete interference by the state prior to an adversary hearing
appears to be an unreasonable restraint on first amendment rights,
which would render the civil statute unconstitutional. The instant
decision demonstrates that restraint on first amendment rights should
not be measured solely by its duration. The court relied on Kingsley
Books, which should be criticized for not adequately protecting first
amendment expression insofar as it established duration as the sole test
of restraint. A more flexible approach to the problem of determining
when first amendment rights are violated has been suggested in recent
decisions by the Supreme Courts and lower cpurts.3 6 This approach
would weigh the likely duration of the restraint and its practical effect on
the dissemination of the material against the state's interest in
restraining it before any adversary hearing. The guiding policy would be
that restraint should be kept to the minimum necessary for protection of
the public interest. Although the seizure of one book might be justified
in light of the public interest, the seizure of only one film would unduly
interfere with normal business.3 7 Similarly, a restraining order
prohibiting all sales might be appropriate where the material was being
foisted on children or an unwilling public; a mass seizure might be
justified when the material was needed as evidence and there was danger
of alteration. A more limited injunction, such as that authorized by the
criminal statute in the instant case, would bar the removal of material
from the court's jurisdiction and would be justified by a lesser degree of
public interest. The state under such an approach should have the burden
of showing that restraint is necessary and that there is no opportunity for
a prior adversary hearing. Any seizure or restraining order would be
tailored to assure minimum interference with first amendment rights.
Although the decision in the instant case answered, however
unsatisfactorily, the question of whether an adversary hearing is required
before injunctive restraint, it did not deal with other significant
constitutional issues posed by obscenity statutes. The court, for example,
34. A Quantiy of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 US. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S.717 (1961).See note41 infra and accompanying text.
35. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Ann, 393 US. 175 (1968).
36. United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1970); Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F.
Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969).
37. "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other method of expression." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503
(1952).
38. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Ann, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
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did not decide whether an adversary hearing is required before an arrest
or seizure of allegedly obscene matter under Tennessee's criminal
statute.39 Since the court approves the rationale that injunctive restraint

is constitutional when an adversary hearing follows immediately,
however, it seems logical that an arrest and seizure, immediately

followed by an adversary hearing, should be likewise constitutional." No
meaningful distinctions can be drawn between an injunction and a
seizure in their potential for interference with the movie distributor's and
book dealer's primary interest, the dissemination of material."
Moreover, an arrest for a violation of obscenity laws is probably
constitutional even without such a provision for a prompt adversary
hearing.42 Another problem ignored by the instant decision concerns the
evidence upon which a judge may base his finding that the material is
obscene, thereby justifying preliminary restraint. The Supreme Court

has ruled that such a finding cannot be based on the conclusionary
statements of police officials, and it has recommended, but has not

required, that the whole film or book be reviewed by the judge.,3 Since

this requirement would place unreasonable burdens on the schedules of
judges,44 it is recommended that a procedure be approved whereby a

judge could base his finding on either a partial review"5 or a graphic
description in an investigator's affidavit .4 If there is further question

39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3003 (1965). The court rejected plaintiff's contention that
§ 39-3003, to be constitutional, had to specifically provide for an adversary hearing prior to
seizure of allegedly obscene materials. Noting that the statute provided for a seizure in any manner
that was lawful, the court concluded that the statute could be constitutionally applied if an adversary hearing was constitutionally required. Cf.Cable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (N.D. Ga.
1969), aff'd, 90 S. Ct. 1351 (1970). But cf. Gundlach v. Rauhauser, 304 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Pa.
1969).
40. If the court had followed its rationale to this conclusion, it would have brought it into
conflict with the District Court of the Western District of Tennessee. See Abrams & Parisi, I nc, v.
Canale, 309 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Tenn. 1969) (ordering the return of film seized under § 39-3003
prior to an adversary hearing).
41. Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv.518,533 (1970).
42. Compare Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), with Delta Book
Distribs., Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969). The dissent argued: "It is no longer
an accepted proposition in tort law that a dog is entitled to one free bite; there should be no rule in
criminal law--even by virtue of the protection accorded to freedom of speech-that every peddler of
pornography is entitled to one free lesson at scatology." Id. at 674 (footnote omitted).
43. See Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 US. 636 (1968) (per curiam).
44. Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970). "I cannot hold that the
Constitution requires a judge to become a nocturnal movie critic in order for society to initiate
prosecutions against obscene films." Id. at 1253.
45. See generally 18 J.Put. L. 205 (1969).
46. Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305
F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). In Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss.), appeal
docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1970) (No. 134), the court allowed the police to seize a
film after they, not the judge, decided it was obscene. The Supreme Court can be expected to
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about the material's obscenity, then the judge at his discretion could
review it more fully. Finally, the instant decision did not announce what

punishment may be imposed for violations of restraining orders when
the material is later found not to be obscene. The Supreme Court in
Kingsley Books, recognizing the additional prior restraint that the

knowledge of certain punishment has on one who is otherwise confident
that he would be exercising constitutionally protected rights, suggested
in dicta that the violator should not be cited for contempt.,7 In Walker v.
City of Birmingham,4 however, the Court, concluding that such
immunity would encourage gambling with judicial orders and
undermine the authority of the courts, rejected this position. In light of
the holding in Walker, it is submitted that the close decision in Kingsley,

premised in part on the assumption that the violator of any order
restraining constitutionally protected expression would not be punished,

should be re-examined by the Supreme Court.

Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-State Statute Requiring
Disclosure of All Substantial Financial Interests of Public
Officials is Overbroad and an Unconstitutional Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiff, a California city, brought a declaratory judgment action
against the county district attorney, seeking to have the state's financial
disclosure law' declared unconstitutional. Plaintiff contended that the

financial interest statement required of public officials, candidates, and
their immediate families 2 was overbroad and an unnecessary intrusion
overturn this decision. See Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 298 F. Supp. 1148 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd,
420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969).
47. The Court drew a distinction between the "prior restraint" involved in a criminal
prdsecution and an injunction, and concluded that a criminal prosecution involved more "prior
restraint" on first amendment rights. The injunctive process was preferred because under it the
distributor could "stand his ground" and "keep the book for sale and sell it at his own judgment."
See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US. 436,442-43 (1957). The Court recognized that this
would not be possible in a case where the state attempts to punish the book seller for violation of the
interim injunction after the issue of obscenity has been ultimately decided in his favor. Id. at 443 n.2.
See Monaghan, First Amendment "'Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 533 n.61 (1970), citing
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U S. 717 (1961).
48. 388 US. 307 (1967) (5-4 decision) (disobedience to court order enjoining violation of
ordinance of questionable constitutionality).
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3600-07,3700-04 (West Supp. 1970).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3700 (West Supp. 1970), provides that, "[e]very public officer shall
file, as a public record, a statement describing the nature and extent of his investments. . . subject
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into the right of privacy.3 The defendant maintained that the statute was
necessary to carry out the legitimate state concern of preventing conflicts
of interest among public officials.4 The Superior Court of Monterrey
County found the statute constitutional. On appeal to the California
Supreme Court, held, reversed. Where a statute requires the disclosure of
all substantial financial interests of public officials, candidates, and their
immediate families, it is overbroad and an unconstitutional invasion of
their right of privacy. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d
259,466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).

The California disclosure law, enacted in 1969, was the latest in a
series of some 85 state laws dealing with the broad field of conflicts of

interest in California. 5 Similar financial disclosure statutes have been
enacted recently by other states 6 and the federal government.7 A

common problem in formulating these statutes has been defining a
conflict of interest." The most concise definition seems to be
"incompatibility between an official's private affairs and public
to regulation by any state or local public agency, if such investment is in excess of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) in value at the time of the statement." Investments are defined in § 3603 to
exclude "a home or property used primarily for personal or recreational purposes." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3702 (West Supp. 1970), requires a candidate to file a § 3700 statement within 10 days of
filing his declaration of candidacy. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3604 (West Supp. 1970), includes those
investments of spouses, minor children, corporations in which the official owns more than 25% of
the stock, and certain trusts of either spouse or minorchildren.
3. The plaintiff also alleged, and the defendant admitted, that ifthe law were upheld as
constitutional, the operations of government would be crippled by the resulting resignations of key
personnel. The following are the local officials who were planning to resign: 3 of 5 members of the
city council; 4 of 7 members of the planning commission; 2 of 5 members of the library board of
trustees; one department head; and 3 cultural commissioners. Other public officials submitted
amicus curiae briefs.
4. The defendant also asserted that there was no present controversy, that there was no
adequate "ripeness" because the filing deadline had not yet passed, and that there were no rights of
individuals involved.
5. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,262 n.l,466 P.2d 225,227 n.l, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 n.l (1970). The court also acknowledged similar regulations in numerous local
ordinances and charter provisions.
6. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.092-.096, .990 (1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
268A, §§ 1-24 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.87-.92 (1967).
7. 18 US.C. §§ 201-18 (1964).
8. See generally Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situationsand Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L.
REv. 666 (1959). One of the most exact yet comprehensive definitions is the following: "A conflict
of interest. . . exists whenever a legislator or other public official has placed himself in a position
where, for some advantagegained or to be gained for himself, he finds it difficult if not impossible to
devote himself with complete energy, loyalty, and singleness of purpose to the general public
interest. The advantage that he seeks is something over and above the salary, the experience, the
chance to serve the people, and the public esteem that he gains from public office." MINNESOTA
GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON ETHICS IN GOV'T REPORT 17 (1959).
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obligations." 9 A more perplexing problem has been determining how to
prevent or remove conflicts of interest. No single method has been

universally used nor has any met with great success. The devices
employed have included instituting a code of ethics,10 requiring financial
statements that are made available only to administrative authorities,"
and requiring the mandatory filing of such statements for public
perusal.1 2 Financial disclosure methods generally have required

disclosure only of financial interests'that have a bearing on official
duties.

3

The California statute,1 4 however, was designed to strengthen

the public's confidence in all levels of government by requiring full
disclosure of all significant financial and business holdings.15 Developing

simultaneously with this long-standing public concern for integrity in
government has been the establishment of an individual's right of
privacy.16 Tracing its roots from Lord Camden's famous opinion two

centuries earlier,1 7 the development of the right of privacy was slow"8
until its emergence as a constitutional doctrine in Griswold v.
Connecticut." In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court held that
the marital relationship was surrounded by a zone of privacy that was
constitutionally protected from the unnecessary intrusion of state

action.20 With the right generally defined and applied to the area of
9.
(1965).

Buss, The Massachusetts Conflict-of-Interest Statute: An Analysis, 45 B.U.L. REV. 299

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.7 (Supp. 1970); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 44.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-501 to -504 (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 3-90(c) (1967).
12. See, e.g.. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 74(3)j) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
13. Many of the older California laws similarly limit disclosure to relevant financial interests.
See, e.g., CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 12783 (West 1968); CAL. WATR CODE § 70077 (West 1966).
14. Prior to the 1969 statute, the broadest enactment, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1090 (West
1966), provided: "Members of the Legislature, state, county, special district, judicial district, and
city officers and employees shall not be financially interested in any contract made by them in their
official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members. Nor shall any state, county,
special district, judicial district, and city officers or employees be purchasers at any sale or vendors
at any purchase made by them in their official capacity."
15. A significant interest is one exceeding $10,000 in value. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3700 (West
Supp. 1970). See note 2 supra.
16. Havighurst, Forewordto Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 251 (1966).
17. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
10.

11.

18. Important discussions in the area may be found in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); and Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193

(1890).
19. 381 US. 479 (1965).
20. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, felt the zone of privacy arose from the first,
third, fourth, and fifth amendments. Id. at 484. Justice Goldberg in a concurring opinion chose to

couch the right of privacy in the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment as supported by the ninth
amendment. Id. at 493.
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marital privacy, the question has become into what other areas, if any,

does this right extend?21 Some courts have reached conflicting
conclusions as to the application of the right of privacy in particular
areas, such as personal appearance.2 Others, while recognizing a general

right of privacy, have refused to expand its protection beyond the home
and family.

Where the familial relationship is involved, however, the

courts have willingly stretched the zone of protected privacy to such
areas as abortion,2 sodomy,2 administrative searches of the home,2 and
family background investigations.2? Only one case concerning a financial

aspect of life, that of election contribution and expenditure statements,
has been litigated with reference to Griswold.2 The general absence of

litigation in the financial area, however, does not indicate a lack of official awareness or concern.29 At least three congressional committees"
21. "[I]t is apparent that the right of privacy is constitutionally protected. It is the when and
how which create the problems." Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835, 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1966)
(Darr, J., concurring).
22. The greatest disagreement has been in the "long hair" cases. See, e.g., Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970). Both
cases held that there was no right to wear long hair. Contra, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969). Total nudity under appropriate circumstances, however, is apparently protected. Roberts v.
Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (total nudity permissible at nudist camp).
23. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 US.
981 (1966) (refusing to grant accused the same rights in a public toilet that he would have in his
home); Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding a law
requiring fingerprinting as a prerequisite to employment with SEC related firms).
24. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (woman has private right to
decide whether to bear her unquickened child). See also United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032
(D.D.C. 1969); People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 915
(1970).
25. Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (sodomy law declared
unconstitutional after a consenting, married couple challenged it). Two other courts have expressed
a willingness to strike down sodomy laws if the plaintiffs were consenting, married adults. Cotner v.
Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969).
26. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); People v. Edwards, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633,
458 P.2d 713 (1969).
27. Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969) (court refused to allow a
search of parentage to determine legitimacy of children for priorities under will).
28. Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (law upheld as constitutional
without reference to an invasion of privacy). Seegenerally Rogers, A Model Bill on the Reporting of
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 23 VAND. L. Ray. 293 (1970). Statutes requiring
election contribution and expenditure statements, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 268-86 (1959), are
frequently called Corrupt Practices Acts.
29. The most notable expression of administrative concern over the individual's right of
privacy came in the "Skallerup Memorandum" that cautioned Department of Defense
investigators against irrelevant inquiries into personal, domestic, and financial matters unless they
have definite security implications. Hearings on Testing Proceduresand the Rights of Federal
Employees Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1965). See also Creech, The Privacy of Government Employees, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 413 (1966).
30. These include the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
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have investigated the area of federal financial disclosure laws 31 and their
effect on employee privacy. Federal legislation also has been introduced
in an attempt to alleviate some of the more critical problems. 32 Interactions of other valid governmental purposes with established constitutional rights have caused the United States Supreme Court to analyze

carefully the priorities of the interests involved. A policy of balancing
the two opposing interests has evolved3 so that regulation of constitu-

tionally protected freedoms is allowed as long as the means employed
narrowly accomplishes a legitimate state purpose and does not stifle
protected freedoms. 34 With national concern readily apparent and with

some policy misgivings evident in both California's legislative and
executive departments,3 a judicial balancing of privacy and public

disclosure was not unexpected.
The instant court initially noted that the state must prove the

necessity of any regulation that impinges upon a constitutionally
protected right. The court found that the right of privacy, while having
no express constitutional support, should encompass the protection of an

individual's home, his papers, and his personal life, including his
financial affairs. The court further acknowledged the legitimate state

concern in creating a public awareness of matters that might result in a
public official's conflict of interest. The statute in question, however,
was considered to have overreached the state's legitimate interest by
the Judiciary, a special subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, and the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.
31. See, e.g., Civil Service Commission regulations, 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.40 -.4 12 (Supp. 1970).
32. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina, has introduced a bill twice, S. 3703, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and S. 3779, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), which would have protected
employees in the executive branch from invasions of privacy concerning their financial affairs.
33. See generally Bruff, UnconstitutionalConditions upon Public Employment: New
Departuresin the Protectionof FirstAmendment Rights, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 129 (1969).
34. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965) (marital privacy held superior to state
purpose of controlling use of contraceptives); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 US. 184 (1964) (state
purpose of preventing breaches of basic concepts of sexual decency must yield when it discriminates
racially); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US. 288 (1964) (state requirements for corporate registration
supply no basis for mandatory disclosure of all members of corporate organization); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state concern for competency and fitness of teachers held not
sufficient to require disclosure of all organizational memberships of individual teachers); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (local ordinance regulating corporations held not sufficient
to require disclosure of all members of corporate association). The California Supreme Court has
adopted a similar policy. Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 409 (1967); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499,421 P.2d 409, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
35. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,277-78,466 P.2d 225,238,85 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 14 (1970).
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requiring the indiscriminate disclosure of financial interests without
apparent concern for their potential relevance. The majority concluded
that a comprehensive disclosure law was not precluded, but found that
the breadth of the instant statute's intrusion into personal financial
affairs caused it to be unconstitutional in its entirety. 36
The primary significance of the instant decision is that it extends for
the first time the zone of constitutionally protected privacy to include
economic affairs. The protection is certainly not pervasive and the court
made it clear that this new aspect of privacy may yield to a narrowly
drawn statute that advances a legitimate state purpose. The California
legislature is now confronted with the problem of drafting a statute that
adequately protects against irrelevant disclosure and still promotes the
public's awarness of potential conflicts of interests. It is submitted that
it will be impossible to incorporate the necessary guidelines into a single
statute due to the myriad of individuals and positions that will be
covered by such a law and the variety of financial interests relevant to
each position. Furthermore, the centralization that will be required
under such a system will create insuperable complications in
administrative control. Therefore, while the basic principles should be
established at the state level, specific application of these principles
should be handled at a level of government more familiar with the
particular positions. The legislature should delegate the authority to
establish criteria to determine the relevance of financial interests to the
board or political body on which an official serves or to which he is
responsible. The effect of the instant case, however, may be considerably
broader than its effect on state financial disclosure laws. The decision
may have opened the door for judicial scrutiny of many data collection
procedures presently in operation. While it is somewhat premature to
accurately predict the extent of judicial inquiry into these procedures, it
is not inconceivable that judicial examination will include such areas as
banking and securities regulation, insurance forms, tax reporting,
political campaign contribution and expenditures, and credit dossiers.
Thus the present decision may elevate many previously unactionable
claims against both government and private agencies to constitutional
36.

The court felt that it could not cure its invalid operation by severance or construction;

therefore, it was forced to declare it unconstitutional in its entirety. 2 Cal. 3d at 273,466 P.2d at
235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The dissent questioned the existence of a case or controversy to support a

declaratory judgment, and further expressed doubts as to the desirability of the court substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature in the area of conflicting policies. The dissenting judges further
contended on the merits that the exclusion of interests less than $10,000 in value from the
application of the statute coupled with the valid state concern resulted in a constitutional disclosure
law that was not overly broad.
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status. In analyzing the validity of this new constitutional challenge, the
courts should follow closely the balancing test developed by the Supreme
Court 7l and assiduously defend the privacy right unless there is a
compelling need for a narrow intrusion into the protected zone. By
employing this analysis, precedents will be established that will serve as
effective tools to keep the use of data collection schemes within
constitutional limits.

Constitutional Law-Sixth Amendment-Admission of Prior
Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence Does Not Violate
Right of Confrontation
Defendant was tried in a California state court for supplying
marijuana to a minor, who testified at a preliminary hearing that he had
obtained the drugs from defendant and was cross-examined on this.point
by defendant's counsel. In order to identify defendant as the supplier, the
prosecutor, when the minor became recalcitrant at trial,' read excerpts
from the minor's previous testimony into the trial record. This evidence
was admitted as substantive proof pursuant to a state statute2 providing
that an inconsistent statement at a hearing is not rendered inadmissible
by the hearsay rule to prove the truth of the statement. Defendant was
convicted and he appealed, contending that the use of the statement as
substantive evidence violated his constitutional right of confrontation.
The district court of appeals reversed 3 and the California Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal, finding the state law unconstitutional in
permitting the substantive use of the witness's prior inconsistent
statements, even though the witness was cross-examined at the
preliminary hearing. 4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. Where a witness's prior inconsistent statement is subject
to effective cross-examination either at a preliminary hearing or at trial,
its substantive evidentiary use at trial, pursuant to a state statute, does
37. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
1. The minor stated he could not remember how he came to have the marijuana and claimed
to be under the influence of LSD at the time of the alleged crime.
2. "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with

Section 770." CAL. EviD. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). Section 770(a) provides that the witness
should be given the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency. Id. § 770(a).
3. People v. Green, 71 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
4. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654,451 P.2d 422,75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
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not violate an accused's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Californiav. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).

The great majority of state hearsay rules provide that pre-trial
statements of a witness are inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter

contained therein but may be admitted to bear on the credibility of the
witness's testimony. 5 The rationale behind this traditional formulation is
that absent certain safeguards at the time of the initial statement, such
as the witness being under oath or subject to effective crossexamination, the trier of fact can merely observe that the statements are

inconsistent but cannot decide which is the truthful statement., On the
other hand, the minority view, adopted in California,7 recognizes that
when the witness testifies at the trial, the existence of procedural
safeguards largely precludes inadmissibility based on hearsay grounds.'
Since the witness is present, he can testify and be cross-examined under

oath concerning his prior inconsistent remarks and the fact finder can
view the witness's demeanor as he explains these inconsistencies. The

admission of prior inconsistent statements for their substantive value has
been supported by many legal scholars

Nevertheless, there has been

some discussion whether the confrontation clause is violated by the
minority approach.10 While the clause' did not purport to adopt
common law rules of hearsay, the external result of the operation of this

constitutional rule in certain circumstances has been similar to that of
the hearsay rule. For example, according to both doctrines, out-of-court

statements by a witness not previously subject to cross-examination have
5. Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1455-57 (1941); see, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612
(8th Cir. 1943).
6. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 39, at 81-82 (1954). See also Comment, Substantive
Use of ExtrajudicialStatements of Witness Under the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 4 U.
RIcH. L. REv. 110 (1969).
7. Only 2 other states, Kentucky and Wisconsin, have adopted such a rule, and these
adoptions were by decision rather than through legislative enactment. See Jett v. Commonwealth,
436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969).
8. McCormick aptly states: "The argument seems persuasive that if the previous statement
and the circumstances surrounding its making are sufficiently probative to empower the jury to
disbelieve the story of the witness on the stand, they should be sufficient to warrant the jury in
believing the statement itself." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 78. See also United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925,933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 US. 984 (1957) (upholding a
conviction for income tax evasion based on extrajudicial statements).
9. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 39; 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed.
1940); Maguire, The HearsaySystem: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741
(1961). See also Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New'Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1965).
10. See Comment, Confrontationand the HearsayRule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
11. The confrontation clause affords the criminal defendant "the right. . . to be confronted
with his accusers and with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
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been inadmissible at trial against a criminal defendant if the witness was

not present at the trial.' Although the reasons for inadmissibility have
differed under each rule, the practical results have been the same. This

equivalence led the Supreme Court in several cases to draw parallels
between these two rules of law. In one case, the Court held that a

significant exception to the hearsay rule, the admissibility of prior
testimony of a *itness who had since died, was also an exception to the
confrontation clause.13 In another decision, a relationship between
confrontation and hearsay was implied by the Court's construction of
certain immigration and naturalization regulations as strictly limiting
the substantive admission of pre-trial statements despite the maker's
presence at the deportation proceedings. 14 More recently, in the
landmark case of Pointer v. Texas, 5 in which the confrontation clause
was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
the Court, in recognizing the defendant's right fo cross-examine

opposition witnesses as a primary purpose of confrontation, seemed
suddenly to have made the common law rules of hearsay mandatory
upon the states. Some correspondence between the clause and common
law hearsay was indicated, but the Court failed to set forth at what
point, if any, these two rules diverged. 6 Although the cases that have
come after Pointer have demonstrated that confrontation and hearsay
do not mean exactly the same thing, the Court has continued to refer to

cross-examination as a constitutional right without delineating the
precise boundaries of that right. 17 Thus, a substantive admission of

preliminary hearing testimony valid under the hearsay rule was held to
12. Compare Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,273-77 (1913) (out-of-court statement
by third party implicating defendant in alleged crime held properly excluded as violative of hearsay
rule), with Douglas v. Alabama, 380 US. 415 (1965) (confession of witness refusing to testify
inadmissible as violative of confrontation right of defendant).
13. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
14. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). The Court seemed to rely upon the rationale of
the majority hearsay approach by construing certain immigration and naturalization regulations to
mean that only a recorded statement, obtained by interrogation under oath and signed by the
maker, could be used for substantive purposes at trial in the maker's presence. Although Bridges
was decided on the basis of the federal rules of evidence rather than the confrontation clause, the
Court suggested by way of dicta that the same principles were applicable to criminal cases. For a
critical evaluation of this decision and its possible impact upon developing state law see Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv. 177, 194-96
(1948).
15. 380 US.400 (1965).
16. The Court construed the confrontation clause to except the dying declaration of a witness,
which is also a well-known exception to the common law hearsay rule. For an in-depth discussion of
the apparent implications of this similarity see Comment, supra note 10.
17. E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (oral confession of co-defendant
inadmissible against another defendant).
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violate a defendant's right of confrontation in one decision in which the
state made no attempt to produce the author of the statement."8
Similarly, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement 9 indicated
that confrontation is somehow different from hearsay and that a
defendant's opportunity to cross-examine an opposition witness is in
some way necessary to the confrontation right.
In the instant case, the Court specifically stated that, while the right
of confrontation and hearsay rules may protect similar interests, a
violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other. After an
examination of the history of the clause, the Court found that crossexamination was intended to assure the defendant of a face-to-face
confrontation with his accusers and of an opportunity to challenge the
accusations made against him. The Court concluded that since there had
been a preliminary cross-examination, the confrontation clause was not
violated and would not have been even if there had been no opportunity
for effective cross-examination at trial. Therefore, the Court held that it
is not unconstitutional to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a
witness as substantive evidence when he is subject to cross-examination
at the trial. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan felt that the majority
did not go far enough in dispelling the confusion concerning the
incorporation of hearsay into the Constitution, and stated that the crux
of confrontation was the availability of the witness at trial.? He finally
concluded that the Constitution should, as a matter of due process,
prevent a state from admitting hearsay evidence in a criminal proceeding
where the witness is available but not present at trial. Dissenting, Justice
Brennan reasoned that the confrontation clause guaranteed a defendant
the right to challenge the inconsistent statements before the fact finders,
and that the witness's conduct at trial in the instant case rendered such
2
cross-examination ineffective. '
The instant decision removes the confrontation clause as a barrier
18. Barberv. Page, 390 US.719 (1968).
19. Harrington v. California, 395 US. 250 (1969) (substantive admissions of confessions that
implicated defendant in alleged crime violated defendant's confrontation right where the authors of
the confessions were not present to be subjected to cross-examination).
20. 399 US. at 172. Mr. Justice Harlan found that previous confrontation cases could be tied
together if the right to confrontation were viewed essentially as requiring the production of a witness
in order to admit his prior statements. Some exceptions to the confrontation clause, such as the
admission of dying declarations, fit neatly into this framework. Justice Harlan also cautioned
against equating the confrontation right with cross-examination, which he felt would enmesh
confrontation and hearsay beyond repair. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
21. 399 U.S. at 189. Since the witness claimed he could not remember what had occurred at

the time of the alleged crime, effective cross-examination was precluded. See note 25 Infra and
accompanying text.
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to state adoption of the minority hearsay position. Since the minimum
confrontation requirements of cross-examination may be satisfied by the
minority approach, the states are free to experiment with hearsay laws
within well-defined and liberal constitutional boundaries. 2 Thus, far
from imposing a federally fashioned common law of evidence on the
states, the instant decision sanctions state-by-state hearsay innovations.
It is submitted, however, that in separating these two doctrines more has
been sacrificed by the Court than uniform hearsay rules. Early crossexamination is not in the best interests of the criminal defendant.
Although cross-examination at a preliminary hearing may fully satisfy
sixth amendment constitutional standards, as a practical matter defense
counsel may often lack sufficient time at this early date in which to plan
a searching cross-examination, whereas he would have been more fully
prepared to defend the rights of his client given the additional time until
trial.2 Further, depending on the Court's interpretation of "good faith"
efforts by the state to produce the witness,2 a prosecutor might be able
to keep a witness from the stand whose very demeanor would tend to
affect the credibility of his testimony, yet still have that testimony
admitted into evidence against the defendant. In such instances,
preliminary examination in the absence of the trial fact finder would
satisfy confrontation requirements despite the defendant's interest in
having the jury examine the witness's demeanor. Even if the witness is
available and present at trial, however, effective cross-examination is not
insured. If the witness refuses to assume a position relating to the truth
of his prior statements, by asserting a lapse of memory, for example, the
trier of fact can only determine the validity of this assertion, not whether
the pre-trial statements are themselves true or false.2? Should the instant
decision lead to such injustices, a stricter constitutional standard based
on due process" could establish a workable balance between the rights of
22. As long as the state hearsay rule provides for cross-examination at trial or before, it will
not be in violation of the confrontation clause.

23. The majority opinion indicates that the opportunity for adequate cross-examination is
not affected by defense counsel's preparedness for such examination. 399 U S. at 165-66.
24. The Court restated the long-standing federal policy of Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237 (1895), that the presence of a witness at trial is necessary to admit his prior testimony unless the
state, after a good faith effort, cannot produce him. The instant case has made this policy
particularly important in the future application of the confrontation clause. See note 13 supra and

accompanying text.
25. The trier of fact can only determine the substantive truth of the alleged lapse of memory
since it is this statement that the witness has asserted before the fact finder. If the witness does not
specifically contradict his preliminary hearing testimony, the truth of that proposition is not put in
question.
26. Due process violation, however, would not have been a desirable basis for the instant
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the criminal defendant and the need for hearsay reform.2? Since the

history of the due process clause has not been enmeshed with hearsay,
the substitution of due process as a new constitutional base from which

to evaluate evidentiary rules would avoid much of the confusion that
necessitated the instant clarification.2s Although what would be violative
of due process would depend upon how, if at all, the rights of the

criminal-defendant are violated by state hearsay rules, some reliance on
due process to anull the adverse effects of an otherwise well-reasoned
minority hearsay approach seems the most feasible alternative for the
future.

Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Warrantless Search of
Automobile Held in Police Custody Does Not Violate the Fourth
Amendment
Petitioner, convicted of armed robbery,1 sought habeas corpus relief
in federal district court 2 alleging the improper admission of evidence at

his trial. Police officers, relying on descriptions given by witnesses, had
arrested petitioner and his companions in a parked car.3 Afterwards, the
car was removed to the police station where it was subjected to a
opinion since the Court would have been pre-empting state action to impose a federal remedy in the
absence of a clear infringement of defendant's personal rights.
27. Some current examples of reform advocated include: MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
503(b) (1942) (hearsay evidence admissible for substantive purposes upon finding that declarant is
present and subject to cross-examination); ALl UNIFORM RuLES OF EVIDENCE 63 (statement is
admissible if previously made by person present at hearing and available for effective crossexamination, provided statement would be admissible if the witness were present at the trial). See
also note 9 supra and accompanying text.
28. A subsequent modification on the basis of effectiveness of cross-examination or on
similar grounds associated with the confrontation clause would tend to re-equate confrontation and
hearsay, and thus undermine the instant decision.
1. Petitioner was indicted and convicted on 2 counts of armed robbery. He was sentenced to a
term of 4 to 8 years on one count and 2 to 7 years on the other, the sentences to run consecutively.
Petitioner did not take direct appeal from these convictions.
2. In 1965, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in a state court, which denied the writ
after a brief evidentiary hearing. This denial was affirmed by the Pennsylvania appellate courts.
Thereafter petitioner initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania.
3. The arrest of petitioner and his 3 companions took place less than an hour after the
robbery of a service station. Witnesses had seen a light blue compact station wagon containing 4
men circling the block in the vicinity of the service station. One of the robbers was reported to be
wearing a green sweater. Petitioner's car fit the description given by the witnesses, and when
arrested, he was wearing a green sweater.
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warrantless search, which yielded the incriminating evidence 4 presented
at petitioner's trial. The petitioner contended that this evidence was
unconstitutionally seized and improperly admitted since police officers
had failed to obtain a search warrant as required by the fourth
amendment. 5 The state contended that since the police had probable
cause to search the car for evidence of the crime, the warrantless seizure
did not violate the petitioner's fourth amendment rights. The district
court adopted the state's position and denied relief.' The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 7 On certiorari to the United

States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A warrantless search of an
arrestee's automobile, after it is taken into police custody, does not
violate the fourth amendment provided there was probable cause for the

search at the time and place of arrest. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970).
In Carroll v. United States,8 the Supreme Court first recognized a
distinction for fourth amendment purposes between searching a house

and searching a car. The need for this distinction stemmed primarily
from problems facing policemen in making highway arrests. While
arresting officers legitimately could search a suspect's person, due to

fourth amendment proscriptions they could not legally search his car
without first procuring a warrant. Frequently, by the time a warrant

could be obtained, either the vehicle had been moved out of the
jurisdiction, or the evidence within the vehicle had been destroyed.

Taking judicial notice of this dilemma, the Court established an
exception to the fourth amendment in the case of cars by holding that
when police have probable cause to believe a car contains evidence of a

crime, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible. The Supreme
Court regularly followed Carroll in its subsequent automobile search

decisions.' Then, in a series of cases culminating with United States v.
4. The items produced in the search were two .38 caliber revolvers, a glove containing change,
and some cards with the name of the robbery victim on them.
5. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
6. United States ev rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 281 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
7. United States ev rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1969).
8. 267 US. 132 (1925).
9. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938); Husty v. United States, 282 US. 694 (193 1). Each of these cases, like Carroll, involved the
search of a car for contraband liquor. In Scher the Court justified the warrantless search of a car
parked in a garage within the curtilage of a private home, because there was probable cause to
believe it contained contraband liquor. WhileScher is not analogous to the instant case, it illustrates
the degree of intrusion possible in the name of probable cause.
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RabinowitzY' the Court ruled that the fourth amendment test for the

legality of warrantless searches was no longer whether it is practicable or
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search itself is

reasonable. The discarded practicability test had been fundamental to
Carrolland had been adopted in a number of related decisions dealing
with house searches incident to arrests." The import of the Rabinowitz
decision was that Carrollwas no longer good authority, but it was not
until fourteen years later that the Supreme Court gave a decisive
indication as to its status. In Preston v. United States, an automobile
search case, the Court effected a merger of the standards set forth in
Rabinowitz and Carroll. Considering the theory of search incident to
arrest, the Court applied the Rabinowitz rationale and found that the
warrantless search involved was so remote in time and place from the
arrest-that it clearly violated the fourth amendment. In supporting this
conclusion, the Court developed reasoning drawn directly from
Carroll.'3 Observing that the arrestee's car had ben in police custody at
the time of the search with the danger of losing the evidence virtually
eliminated, the Court determined that there was no justification -for
allowing an exception to the warrant requirement. The Preston
10. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The Court focused upon 5 considerations to determine the
reasonableness of the search: "(1) the search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place
of the search was a public room to which the public, including the officers, was invited; (3) the room
was small and under the immediate and complete control of respondent; (4) the search did not
extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered
stamps was a crime... "'Id. at 64. Mr. Justice Frankfurter issued a strong dissent, arguing that
historically the exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement have been narrowly
defined. He felt that the opportunity to obtain a warrant was definitely a relevant consideration. The
danger of the Court's decision was that the test of reasonableness made it easy to slide from the
warrantless search of arrestee's person to his entire premises.
For cases leading up to the Rabinowitz rationale see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
11. See McDonald v. United States, 335 US. 451 (1948) (an officer making a warrantless
search must show that it was justified by the circumstances); Trupiano v. United States, 334 US.
699 (1948) (law enforcement agents in seizing goods must secure and use search warrants whenever
reasonably practical); Taylor v. United States, 286 US. 1 (1932) (warrantless search illegal where
no danger of change in evidence and where agents had an excellent opportunity to get a warrant).
12. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). See Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969) (court
held that Preston established a general rule prohibiting warrantless searches of automobiles in
police custody). Contra,United States ex reL Spero v. McKendrick, 409 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1969).
13. 376US.at368.
14. In Cooper v. California,386 US. 58 (1967), the Court allowed the warrantless search of
an automobile at a police station. Because of the nature of the crime, a narcotics violation, the entire
car was considered evidence under state law. For a discussion of Cooper's place in the line of
warrantless automobile search decisions see The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV.
112, 119-21 (1967). The author concludes that the close relationship between the search and the
reasons for arrest were the real basis of the Cooperdecision.
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approach was subsequently reaffirmed in Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Manufacturing Co. 15 in which it was held that the reasons thought
sufficient to justify a warrantless search would no longer obtain when the
accused was in the custody of police. This trend toward narrowly
restricting exceptions to the fourth amendment was continued in Chimel
v. California.6 In making a clear break with the reasonableness test of
Rabinowitz, the Court held that the fourth amendment requires a
warrant for the search of any area beyond the arrestee's immediate
control. With this decision, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
fourth amendment had gone full circle and returned to its preRabinowitz strictness. Because it could reasonably be construed to
eliminate the exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles,
Chimel expressly provided that Carrollwas still viable authority.
In the instant case, the Court initially reviewed the facts preceding
the arrest and the search. Examining the Preston and Dyke decisions, the
Court held that neither could justify the warrantless search of the
petitioner's car as being incident to his arrest since the search was clearly
too remote in time and place. Preston and Dyke were further
distinguished from the case at hand because probable cause was
unmistakably absent from both. Turning its attention to the Carroll
decision, the Court found that since its rendition probable cause had
been sufficient to justify a warrantless automobile search whenever there
was danger of losing evidence of a crime. 7 Given the probable cause in
this case, the Court concluded that there was little practical difference
between an immediate search without a warrant and the automobile's
immobilization until a warrant was obtained. Which course of action
presented the greater or lesser intrusion upon fourth amendment rights
was, in the Court's judgment, "a debatable question. . . the answer [to
which] may depend on a variety of circumstances."'' 8 Accordingly, the
Court held that both courses of action were reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Justice Harlan, dissenting, strongly objected to the
majority's conclusion, arguing that exceptions under the fourth
amendment should be no broader than necessitated by the exigencies of
the case. Recognizing that the Court had established limited exceptions
15. 391 US. 216 (1968).
16. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). For an analysis of Chimel's effect on warrantless automobile
searches see Note, WarrantlessSearches in Light of Chimel: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 11 ARIz. L. Rev. 457 (1969); Note, Chimel v. California:A PotentialRoadblock to
VehicleSearches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626 (1970).
17. See cases cited notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
18. 399 US. at5l-52.
19. Id. at 55.This idea has been expressed several times by the Supreme Court during the past
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to the warrant requirement to assure the personal safety of policemen
and to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence, Justice Harlan
determined that the circumstances of this case did not come within either
recognized exception. Thus, he concluded that the warrantless search of
the petitioner's car clearly involved the greater sacrifice of fourth
amendment values.
Despite retaining the probable cause requirement, the instant
decision marks a significant departure from the line of automobile
search cases that have followed Carroll. At the core of Carroll's
exception to the warrant requirement was the need to prevent the
removal or destruction of evidence?2 In the case at hand, after the police
had taken custody of the car, the exigent circumstances deemed
necessary under Carrollto justify a warrantless search ceased to exist.
The petitioner's car was no longer mobile, and the evidence believed to
be inside was not in danger of destruction or removal. Had the Court
-adhered to precedent, it unquestionably would have found that the,
search did not come within Carroll'sexception. Instead, the Court took
the position that there is no practical or constitutional difference
between the immediate, warrantless search of an automobile and the
automobile's immobilization until a warrant can be obtained. As Justice
Harlan's analysis vividly indicates,21 the majority's reasoning in this
regard is patently fallacious. When a person wishes to avoid a police
search-either to protect his privacy or to hide incriminating
evidence-the lesser intrusion will always be the seizure of the
automobile in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate pass
upon the justification for the searchY On the other hand, when an
individual has nothing to hide and is unconcerned about the privacy of
his automobile, he can simply consent to an immediate search and
thereby avoid any delay. In short, when consent is not forthcoming,
there is a vital individual interest protected by the fourth amendment
decade. See Chimel v. California, 395 US. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp clearly recognized the preventive function of the fourth
amendment.
20. It has been argued that Carrollreally applies only to cases where there is a crime in the
presence of police, as the contraband cases were. This view would severely restrict the exceptions to
the fourth amendment. The courts never adopted it. But, given the background of necessity in
Carroll,it does not seem that any decision can be consistent with it if police could have obtained a

warrant.
21. 399 US. at 63-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. The facts which establish probable cause to search usually justify an arrest.
Unquestionably, when a person is arrested and taken into police custody, the seizure of his
automobile until a warrant is obtained involves a lesser intrusion upon fourth amendment rights
than a warrantless search. Id.
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even though the circumstances justify a temporary seizure of the
automobile. Moreover, by the majority's own standards of
reasonableness, there is no case in which a warrantless search is
permissible unless conducted under exigent circumstances at the time
and place of arrest. No greater intrusion can be justified on the basis of
probable cause. Yet, the Court in the case at hand allowed a greater
intrusion-the warrantless search of petitioner's car after its

immobilization even though police could easily have obtained a
warrant .2 3- The result is a broadening of the exception to the fourth
amendment for automobile searches to the extent that the line of

decisions following Carroll is overruled. In addition, this opinion
conflicts with recent decisions, which have been influenced considerably

by the historically grounded concept that the fourth amendment is
preventive rather than corrective in function. 4 Under this prevailing

formulation, the fourth amendment is treated as a barrier protecting
individual privacy from arbitrary police intrusion,25 rather than as a

means of suppressing evidence that has been illegally obtained. Much in
contrast to these ideas, this case facilitates police evasion of the
magistrate's scrutiny. If the existence of probable cause to search a car is

questioned, the police can justify their actions after the fact. Plainly, this
makes the fourth amendment corrective in function, but more seriously

it places a heavy burden of proof on the individual who must henceforth
vindicate his rights by showing that a consummated search was

unreasonable. This unfortunate result may be further compounded
because a court's ultimate determination as to the legality of a search
may conceivably be influenced by the nature of the evidence involved. It
is doubtful that this decision aids law enforcement enough to justify such
a substantial erosion of fourth amendment safeguards. One need look
23. The dissent disapproved of the fact that the Court did not make an inquiry into the
officers' ability promptly to take their case before a magistrate. The dissent noted that the car and
its contents were at all times secure from removal or destruction and it questioned the necessity of a
warrantless search under those circumstances.
24. See Frankfurter's dissents in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56,68-86 (1950), and
Harris v. United States, 331 US. 145, 155-81 (1947), where he reviews the histoiy both in England
and the United States out of which the warrant requirement grew. For another discussion of the
historical background of the warrant requirement see Note, Warrantless Searches in Light of
Chimel: A Return to the Original Understanding, 11. ARIZ. L. REv. 457,460 (1969).
25. See cases cited note 19 supra; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969) (a man has the
right to possess obscene movies and literature within'the privacy of his home); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wiretapping without a warrant violates the fourth amendment). Taken
together these decisions reflect a trend towards a highly protected right to be free from arbitrary
police intrusion. Underlying each of these decisions is the idea that the fourth amendment is
protective in nature. For a discussion of this topic see Note, From Private Places to Personal
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968).

1376

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

back no further than the period following Rabinowitz with its recurring
delayed searches to understand the abuses that inevitably result from
leaving individual rights too much in the discretion of police. 2 If that
period demonstrates anything, it shows that the constitutional "right of
the people to be secure . . .against unreasonable searches and
seizures" is meaningless without an effective restraint upon police
power in the form of strict adherence to the warrant requirement.

Labor Law-Jurisdictional Dispute-NLRB May Not Resolve
Work Assignment Dispute in Section 10(k) Proceeding When
Disputing Unions Have Agreed to Binding Arbitration
Petitioner, Plasterers Local 79, was involved in two inter-union
jurisdictional disputes,' which were eventually submitted 2 to the Joint
Board3 for binding arbitration. The other union, Tile Setters Local 20,
refused to relinquish the work assigned to petitioner in the arbitration
award, and petitioner's members promptly established picket lines at
both jobsites.4 Subsequently, one of the employers filed unfair labor
26. See, Broeder, Wong Sun v. UnitedStates: A Study in Faithand Hope,42 NEn. L. REv.
483,496-503 (1963). This article contains a strong criticism of Rabinowitz and the effects of the rule
of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. See also Note, Chimel v. California:A Potential
Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 626, 632 (1970). This article discusses the
police practice of delayed searches designed to take advantage of the Rabinowitz rule that
warrantless searches were not illegal where incident to a lawful arrest. Police would delay the arrest
until certain that suspect could be seized at the location of the evidence. Rabinowitz did not allow
such a practice, but proof of a police conspiracy to violate the fourth amendment was almost
impossible.
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See note5 supra.
1. The term "jurisdictional dispute" denotes a work assignment dispute (dispute over which
union, if any, has the right to have work performed by its members), although it has also been used
to mean a representational dispute (dispute over which union, if any, has the right to represent or
bargain for a group of workers). See Sussman, Section 10(k): Mandatefor Change?, 47 B.U.L.
REv. 201 (1967). The disputes in the instant case concerned unrelated jobs.
2. Actually, only one of the 2 disputes was submitted for arbitration, but the tasks were
sufficiently similar that the award covered work involved at both jobsites.
3. Both unions are members of the AFL Building and Construction Trades Department and
had previously agreed to be bound by decisions of the National Joint Board for the Settlement of
Jurisdictional Disputes established by that labor organization in conjunction with certain
contractors' associations. For a discussion of the Joint Board see Atleson, The NLRB and
JurisdictionalDisputes:The Aftermath of CBS, 53 GEo. L.J. 93,130 (1964). For general discussion
of the Joint Board see note 21 infra and accompanying text.
4. The rival union refused to relinquish the work on one job and petitioner started picketing
before obtaining a clarification of the Joint Board award. After the clarification, continued refusal
to accede on both jobs led to picket lines being established on the second jobsite.
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practice charges against petitioner, and following a consolidated hearing
under section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 the NLRB
awarded the disputed work to the Tile Setters Union. Petitioner refused
to accept this determination, resumed picketing, and was charged with

an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(4)(D). 7 Petitioner
contended that the work assignment issued pursuant to the section 10(k)
hearing was invalid because the unions had previously agreed upon a
voluntary method for adjusting the dispute, thereby invoking the
abstention clause of section 10(k). The abstention clause specifically

prohibits the NLRB from resolving a dispute out of which an alleged
unfair labor practice arises if the "parties to such dispute" have agreed
upon voluntary adjustment.' Upon analyzing the statutory language, the
Board determined that the employer is a "party to the dispute" who
must have participated in the adjustment procedure along with the

disputing unions before the abstention clause will become operative.
Therefore, the Board found that petitioner's conduct constituted an

unfair labor practice and entered a cease-and-desist order.? On petition
to review I0 and cross-petition to enforce, the Court of Appeals for the
5. "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of paragraph (4)(d) of section 8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and
determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practiceshall have arisen, unless, within ten
days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board
satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment
of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon
such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed." 29 U.S.C. § 160(k)
(1964),formerly ch. 372, § 10(k),49 Stat. 453 (1935) (emphasis added).
A § 10(k) hearing is held only after unfair labor practice charges are filed. See notes 44, 47
infra.
6. Plasterers Local 79, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,419 (1967).
7. "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization. . . to engage in, or to induce
or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or. . . to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is. . .(D)
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor
organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor
organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees
performing such work .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1964),formerly ch. 372, § 8(b)(4)(D),
49 Stat. 452 (1935).
8. "[T]he Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute . . . unless
• . . thepartiesto such disputesubmit to the Boardsatisfactory evidence that they have. . . agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of. . . the dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964)
(emphasis added to abstention clause).
9. The order contained 2 parts: (1) petitioning union must cease and desist from prohibited
means of obtaining assignment of work to its members and (2) the union must take affirmative
action by posting notice indicating intention to abide by the order. The NLRB decision in the unfair
labor practice phase of the case is reported at 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25, 074 (1968).
10. There is no independent review of § 10(k) work assignments. Therefore, the only stage at
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District of Columbia Circuit, held, enforcement denied. The NLRB may

not properly determine a jurisdictional dispute pursuant to section 10(k)
of the National Labor Relations Act when the disputing unions have
agreed upon settlement through binding arbitration, regardless of
employer participation. PlasterersLocal 79 v. NLRB, 63 CCH LAB. L.
REP. (1970 CCH Lab. Cas.)
10,993 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970).

Work assignment disputes were permitted at common law" and
remained virtually unaffected by attempted remedies.12 The economic

waste1 3 and public distaste 14 caused by these disputes resulted in
regulatory legislation by the 80th Congress.15 Although there was
considerable debate on the best means of combating problems inherent
which the union can contest the work award is on review of the § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice
order. If the § 10(k) order fails, the unfair labor practice order fails with it. See NLRB v. Local
99 1, Longshoremen, 332 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1964). See also note 44 infra.
11. Jurisdictional strikes were permissible at common law, except when used as a
boycott against an employer who was not a party to the dispute. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572,
78 N.E. 753 (1906). Equitable remedies were limited by the Federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1932
(Norris-La Guardia Act) ch. 90, §§ 1-15,47 Stat. 70, as amended29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1965),
which limited the federal judiciary's injunctive jurisdiction. See Green v. Obergfell, 121 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (denying employer requested injunction). The National Labor Relations Act of
1935, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1965), proscribed employer
action as unfair labor practices, so that prior to its amendment in 1947, parties economically
injured by jurisdictional strikes were generally without remedy. See Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96
F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1938) (injured party held to be without remedy).
12. Specific causes of jurisdictional disputes include: (1) overlapping ofjurisdictional claims
and skills; (2) existence of dual unionism; (3) aggressiveness of some unions; and (4) change in
methods, machinery, and materials. Several intra-industry methods of settling jurisdictional
disputes were attempted unsuccessfully prior to the Taft-Hartley Act. Several states intervened and
and enacted statutes "outlawing" jurisdictional strikes. See generally K. STRAND, JURISDICTIONAL
DISPUTES IN CONSTRUCTION: THE CAUSES, THE JOINT BOARD, AND THE NLRB 34-70 (1961).
Federal prosecution under anti-trust law was also attempted in order to stop jurisdictional strikes.
See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (jurisdictional strike is not a restraint of trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act).
13. The staggering amount of time lost as a.result of work stoppages and strikes over
jurisdictional disputes was a prime factor in shaping public opinion and instigating congressional
action. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in 1944 that approximately 10% of all man days
lost as a result of labor disputes were due to jurisdictional disputes. In 1946, a low of 0.9% was
recorded as compared to 2.4% in 1947, the year of passage of Taft-Hartley. The low figure for 1946
has been attributed to fear of impending legislation on the part of labor. Sussman, supra note I, at
206.
14. See 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1012
(1948) (remarks of Senator Taft) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATrvE HISTORY]; id. vol. 1, at 583
(remarks of Representative Landis). President Truman cited public dissatisfaction with these
"indefensible" disputes in his appeal for congressional regulation in his 1947 State of the Union
Message to Congress. Id. at 85 1; 93 CONG. REC. 136 (1947).
15. President Truman requested legislation to protect innocent employers from inter-union
strife, stating in part that "when rival unions are unable to settle such disputes themselves, provision
must be made for peaceful and binding determination of the issue." 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947)
(State of the Union Message on January 6, 1947).
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in jurisdictional strikes,"6 it was agreed that regulation was necessary to
protect the interest of the public and the neutral employer. 17 Legislators
expected that a governmental mechanism for resolving work assignment
disputes would encourage voluntary settlements, 8 thereby promoting the
development of private mechanisms of mediation. 19 As enacted, 20 section
10(k) directed the NLRB to hear and determine the dispute out of which

an unfair labor practice charge had arisen, but required abstention from
any determination when "the parties to the dispute" submit satisfactory

evidence of either a voluntary adjustment or an agreed-upon method of
adjustment. The building trade unions responded to section 10(k) by
establishing the Joint Board 2' to arbitrate disputes privately.2 Unlike the
Joint Board, however, which acted vigorously to settle jurisdictional
disputes, the NLRB narrowly interpreted its duty to hear and determine
disputes23 and declined to make any affirmative awards of disputed
work.2 Thus, the NLRB gave the employer a virtually unlimited right to
16. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1058 (remarks of Senator Ellender
proposing to grant an employer the right to seek a private injunction); Hearingson S. 55 and S.J.
Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963-64
(1947) (remarks of Senator Morse, author of § 10(k), proposing appointment of arbitrators). See
also Note, Determination of Jurisdictional Disputes Under Section 10(k): Conflict with Other
Provisionsof the National LaborRelations A ct, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1142, 1144-46 (1961).
17. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947). See also 93 CONG. REC. 1890 (1947) (remarks of Senator Morse).
18. Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1963, 1965 (1947).
19. See Note, supra note 16, at 1146 n.22.
20. Senator Morse's original proposal was changed so that NLRB determination was
compulsory rather than discretionary by adding the words "and directed." A provision authorizing
reference by the Board to an arbitrator also was deleted. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14,
at 987.
21. With the active encouragement of the NLRB, the National Joint Board for the
Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes was formed in October 1949 by an agreement between the
Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL, later to become the Building Trades
Department of the combined AFL-CIO, and nationwide general and special contractors'
associations. The Joint Board, which consists of one impartial chairman and an equal number of
representatives from both labor and employer groups, renders hundreds ofjob decisions annually.
See generally O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52
GEO.

L.J. 314 (1964).

22. The Joint Congressional Committee on Labor-Management Relations approved the
creation of the Joint Board as a move toward implementing the congressional purpose of
encouraging private settlements of work assignment disputes. Id. at 319 n.35. See also notes 18-19
supraand accompanying text.
23. O'Donoghue, supra note 21, at 315. The NLRB merely decided whether a striking union
was entitled to have work assigned to it under a prior Board order or certification or a collective
bargaining agreement.
24. See, e.g., Local 675, Operating Eng'rs, 116 N.L.R.B. 27, 38 (1956) (merely examined
contractual relations).
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assign work by affirming his assignments25 and refusing to hear any
dispute on its merits. 26 Some circuits concurred in the Board's narrow
interpretation of its role,27 while others refused to enforce NLRB orders
for failure to make the determination that section 10(k) required." This
controversy was finally settled by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Radio
& Television Broadcast Engineers Union2 ' (hereinafter referred to as
CBS) in which the Court concluded that the Board was required to have
a full hearing on the merits to decide the jurisdictional dispute and make
an affirmative award, even though section 10(k) contained no standards
to "determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall
have arisen." ' 30 Section 10(k) was interpreted as relieving neutral
employers of the necessity of resolving disputes. 31 Despite the mandate of
CBS and intimations made in its next decision, 32 the NLRB continued
its practice of following the employer's assignment,3 while ignoring
25. The NLRB construed § 8(b)(4)(D) as guaranteeing an employer an unlimited right to
make work assignments and viewed § 10(k) simply as a means of upholding that right. Note,
JurisdictionalDisputes Since the CBS Decision, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 657, 659 (1964). See also
Sussman, supra note 1.
26. Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 1207 (1958), enforcement denied, 272 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1959).
27. E.g., NLRB v. Local 450, Operating Eng'rs, 275 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1960) (NLRB
interpretation of its role-limited to legal considerations of prior Board orders, certifications, or
collective bargaining agreements-essentially approved).
28. NLRB v. Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 272 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 573
(1961); NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 261 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. United Ass'n
of Journeymen, 242 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1957).
29. 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
30. Id. at 583. The Court noted NLRB experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor
problems and knowledge of the standards generally used in determining jurisdictional disputes. The
Court concluded that the Board should perform the job assigned to it by Congress even though no
express standards were given in the statute. Id.
31. In citing the legislative history of § 10(k), the Court said that if the NLRB interpretation
were accepted, the employer would be left to decide the dispute, as he did prior to § 10(k)'s
enactment. Citing H.R. REP. No. 245,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), the Court said that § 10(k)
was enacted to protect employers from being the "helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern
them at all." 364 U.S. at 580-81.
32. The Board said it would consider all relevant factors in making jurisdictional awards, not
just the assignment by the employer, and would decide each case on its own facts. Lodge 1743,
Machinists, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
33. See, e.g., Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962) (the employer's
assignment was determinative). See generally Cohen, The NLRB and Section 10(k): A Study of the
Reluctant Dragon, 14 LAB. L.J. 905 (1963). The Board claimed, however, that it was considering

many factors. Local 3, Bricklayers, 144 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1963) (skills); Local 68, Lathers, 142
N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963) (agreements between unions); Teamsters Local 327, 142 N.L.R.B. 170 (1963)
(decisions of the AFL-CIO); Local 45, Bridge Workers, 141 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1963) (efficiency);
Local 3, Elec. Workers, 141 N.L.R.B. 888 (1963) (economy); Mailers' Union No. 6, 137 N.L.R.B.
665 (1962) (company practices); Local 853, Operating Eng'rs, 136 N.L.R.B. 993 (1962) (collective
bargaining agreements).
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repeated Joint Board awards to the contrary. 34 The NLRB also

continued to follow its earlier decisions5 indicating that the abstention
clause did not oust its power to determine a dispute unless the employer,
as well as the rival unions, had agreed to be bound by arbitration3
Although the legislative history of section 10(k) does not expressly
indicate whether the word "parties" includes the employer, 37 it has been
suggested that the theory underlying the NLRB interpretation is that the

employer is likely to accept the results of arbitration, making the
settlement meaningful and final, only when he is bound.3 Nevertheless,
many authorities have argued that voluntary adjustment by the
disputing unions alone should invoke the abstention clause, thereby

minimizing jurisdictional strikes and finalizing settlements at the earliest
stage possible.3 Some federal courts have assumed that the employer
must be bound by the voluntary adjustment before the abstention clause

is invoked; 40 however, at least one federal court has specifically indicated
that the dispute referred to in the abstention clause is the jurisdictional

dispute between unions and that therefore the employer is not a party to
41

the dispute.

34. E.g., Local 1622, Carpenters, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962) (Board rejected 300 contrary
decisions of the Joint Board over a 13 year period in upholding an mployer assignment).
35. Local 173, Lathers, 121 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1103-04 (1958) (settled principle that employer
responsible for assignment of the disputed work must be a party to adjustment); Lodge 68,
Machinists, 81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949) (first case ruling that an employer must consent prior to
dismissal).
36. E.g., Local 79, Plasterers, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,419 (1967) (employer's original
assignment upheld); Local 562, Journeymen, 155 N.L.R.B. 695 (1965) (employer assignment
upheld); Carpenters Dist. Council of Denver & Vicinity, 146 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1245 (1964) (Board
had jurisdiction because the employer had not agreed to be bound); Deliverers' Union, 141
N.L.R.B. 578, 580 (1963) (voluntary adjustment must bind both disputing unions and the
employer). Contra, Local 49, Operating Eng'rs, 164 N.L.R.B. 94 (1967) (reversing employer
assignment).
37. No mention was made of the employer's participation in private settlements
under § 10(k). See, e.g., 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1012 (remarks of Senator Taft);
id. at 1046 (remarks of Senator Murray); id. at 1157 (remarks of Senator Smith); id. at 950, 1554
(remarks of Senator Morse); id. vol. 1, at 615 (remarks of Representative Hartley).
38. See Atleson, supra note 3, at 111-12.
39. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 33, at 909, 918; O'Donoghue, supra note 21, at 338;
Sussman, supra note 1, at 209, 211, 229.
40. E.g., Typographical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755, 763 (5th Cir. 1966) (contract
between employer and one union not controlling in determining jurisdictional dispute); NLRB v.
Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 326 F.2d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 1964) (employer not bound, and one union
had expressly refused to be bound); Local 450, Operating Eng'rs v. Elliott, 256 F.2d 630, 636 (5th
Cir. 1958) (assumed employer to be bound but did not decide if he need be; showing of satisfactory
evidence of agreement is a question for the Board under wording of the statute).
41. Penello v. Local 59, Metal Workers, 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961). The court
emphatically pointed out that this case involved a dispute between an employer and a single union
and that there was no dispute between rival unions. Therefore, any comments made about the
voluntary adjustment abstention provision of § 10(k) were merely dictum.
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The instant court examined the text of section 10(k) and held that
the phrase "parties to such dispute" in the abstention clause referred to
the "dispute out of which [the] unfair labor practice [had arisen],"'
which the Supreme Court in CBS4 2 had construed to mean the
jurisdictional dispute. Noting precedent for its interpretation,4 3 the court
examined the legislaive history and found that the purpose of section
10(k) would be effectuated by binding adjustments between the disputing
employee groups. The court further recognized that while Congress
could have expressly made the employer a necessary party to voluntary
adjustment, it had declined to do so. Therefore, the majority concluded
that the scope of the term "parties" in the abstention clause includes
only the rival unions. The court held, consequently, that the NLRB may
not properly resolve a jurisdictional dispute pursuant to section 10(k)
after the disputing unions have agreed to settle their dispute through
binding arbitration. The dissent contended that because the traditional
NLRB interpretation of the abstention clause had gone unchanged, it
must be assumed that Congress has acquiesced with approval in the
NLRB construction. Observing that the NLRA does not deal with
jurisdictional disputes but only with jurisdictional strikes,4 the dissent
interpreted the language "such dispute" as referring to the dispute out of
which the unfair labor practice arose, which was found to mean the
strike. Thus, the dissent concluded that the phrase "parties to such
dispute" means the parties to the jurisdictional strike which necessarily
includes the employer.
Although the instant court reaches an interpretation of section
10(k) that is justified by statutory text and administrative feasibility,
reliance on federal court dicta and indeterminative legislative history
renders the conclusiveness of the decision doubtful. The dissent's theory
that congressional acquiescence in NLRB interpretations of section
10(k) indicates unqualified acceptance effectively neutralizes the
majority's position that the omission of the employer from the
abstention clause implies a deliberate congressional exclusion from the
phrase "parties to such dispute." Instead of drawing such tenuous
inferences from legislative silence, the court should have determined
whether the employer is a requisite "party" in light of section 10(k)'s
fundamental purpose of reducing work stoppages brought about by
42. 364 US. 573 (1961). See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
43. The court cited Penello v. Local 59, Metal Workers, 195 F. Supp. 458 (D.Del. 1961). But
see note 41 supra and accompanying text.
44. "IT]he Act does not deal with the controversy anterior to a strike nor provide any
machinery for resolving such a dispute absent a strike." Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 US.
261,263 (1964) (Douglas, J.) (representational dispute).

19701 '

RECENT CASES

jurisdictional strikes. The basic problem presented is how to properly
implement this purpose. The NLRB has consistently proceeded on the
theory that only when an employer has agreed to be bound by the
voluntary adjustment is he likely to abide by that determination. 5 This
theory, however, ignores the unanimous assumption made during
congressional debate that protection is needed for the neutral employer"
who, by definition, is unconcerned with which employee group obtains
the work assignment. A more reasonable implementation of the
fundamental policies involved could have been achieved by a strict
reading and analysis of the statute. A section 10(k) hearing will never be
possible until an unfair labor practice charge is filed, which probably
means that there is a jurisdictional strike.47 The NLRB is empowered to
determine the dispute out of which the unfair labor charge arose.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in CBS, this, of necessity,
means the jurisdictional dispute because the strike arises therefrom and
has reached its climax by the stage at which the employer becomes
involved. Therefore the "dispute" that the NLRB must determine is the
same "dispute" that must be voluntarily adjusted before the abstention
clause is invoked, and the parties to such "dispute" of necessity are the
rival unions, not the employer. The instant decision implements specific
legislative policy and correctly applies statutory language, -1ut
implications of future problems are readily apparent and further
refinements are to be expected. The neutral employer is concerned only
with having work performed regardless of which employee group does
the work, and should he fortuitously fail to agree to be bound by a
voluntary adjustment, he will no longer be plagued by jurisdictional
strikes from unions dissatisfied with arbitration. The non-neutral
employer, however, must await a determination as to whether a binding
union agreement can short-circuit his interest in selecting a particular
employee group because the instant decision does not define its
limitations. Since the abstention clause was intended to protect neutral
employers, the non-neutral employer situation does not properly fall
within its scope; therefore, it should be decided that the NLRB has
jurisdiction to review union arbitration agreements whenever interested
45. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
46. See notes 17,31 supra and accompanying text.
47. Note 44 supra. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed over a presidential veto contending:
"The bill would force unions to strike or or to boycott if they wish to have ajurisdictional dispute
settled by the National Labor Relations Board. This peculiar situation results from the fact that the
Board is given authority to determine jurisdictional disputes over assignment of work only after
such disputes have been converted into strikes or boycotts." I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14,
at 916.
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employers are concerned. This result can be reached by an expansive
reading of the statutory requirement of submitting satisfactory evidence
of the voluntary adjustment to the NLRB. Any decision to the contrary
will render the broader policy of promoting industrial peace subservient
to the particular purpose of section 10(k) by omitting any consideration
of employer interest. The employer is effectively deprived of any judicial
review of an inter-union adjustment unless the award is clearly
arbitrary, 48 and an employer who feels that one employee group is better
qualified to perform particular tasks 'will be faced with the option of
assigning work to the prevailing group or suffering the possibility of a
strike. Another possible implication is more intense controversy in the
area of collective bargaining because an employer is effectively bound to
deal with the union prevailing in the voluntary adjustment procedure.
Nevertheless, public interest will be enhanced by the instant decision,
because a jurisdictional strike will no longer serve to initiate the
determination of a jurisdictional dispute once the rival unions have
agreed to be bound by private settlement.

Redemption Statutes Not
Property -Mortgages-State
Applicable to Foreclosure by the United States on FHA Insured
Mortgage
The United States, assignee of a federally insured mortgage,
brought a foreclosure suit in federal court against the mortgagor,
Stadium Apartments, Inc.' The mortgage had been. insured by the
FHA.2 When the mortgagor defaulted, the United States paid the
mortgagee the amount of insurance due in return for an assignment.
Although a state statute provided redemption rights after foreclosure,4
48.

It is a general principle that arbitration awards are subject tojudicial review when clearly

arbitrary.
1. The mortgagee assigned the mortgage to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to the applicable provisions of Title VI of the National Housing Act governing its rights upon default. 12 U.S.C. § 1743(c) (Supp. IV, 1969),amending 12 US.C. § 1743(c)
(1964). The Secretary proceeded-to foreclose under the authority granted by other provisions of the
Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(k), 1743(f) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(k), 1743(f)
(1964).
2. The mortgage was insured under the provisions of Title VI of the National Housing Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1736-46(a) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1736-46(a) (1964).
3. The Secretary of HUD paid the mortgagee the amount of insurance due as required by the
applicable provisions of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1743(c) (Supp. IV, 1969),
amending 12 U.S.C. § 1743(c) (1964).
4. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-402 (Supp. 1969). The statute allows the mortgagor or his lien
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the United States contended that these rights were not applicable to its
own efforts to recover funds paid to a mortgagee under the federal
insurance commitment.5 The district judge framed the foreclosure decree
to include a one-year redemption period pursuant to the state statute. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held,
reversed. State redemption statutes are not applicable in actions
instituted by the United States to foreclose FHA insured mortgages.
United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1970).
Many states have statutes permitting mortgagors and, in most
cases, junior lien creditors to redeem mortgaged property within a
specified time after judicial sale pursuant to a foreclosure decree. While
these statutes protect the mortgagor's investment by giving additional
time for refinancing, 7 they are primarily designed to force the buyer at a
creditors to redeem real property of more than 20 acres up to one year after sale by paying the
purchaser the amount of purchase and 6% interest from the date of sale. A 6-month period is
provided for tracts of less than 20 acres.
5. While not determinative of the United States' contention, the mortgage contained a
provision required by federal regulation in which the mortgagor waived "to the extent permitted by
law. . . any right to a stay or redemption.
... The mortgage form was prescribed by 24 C.F.R.
§§ 580.10-37 (Supp. 1947), pursuant to authority granted the Secretary by 12 U.S.C. § 1742
(Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1742 (1964) "to make such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."
6. ALA. CODE tit.7, § 727 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.35.210-50 (1962 &Supp. 1969); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1281 to -89 (1956 & Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1111 (1947)
(mortgagor only); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 701-07 (West 1955 & Supp. 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 118-9-2 to -3 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to -407 (1948 & Supp. 1969); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 18-27 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 628 (1950 &
Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.220 (1969) (mortgagor
only); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 6201-313 (1964 & Supp. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.3240 (Supp. 1970) (morgagor only); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.23-.24, 581.10 (Supp.
1970); Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1949) (mortgagor only); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-5833
to -5841 (1963); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 21.200-50 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2-19 (Supp. 1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-24-01 to -11 (1960 & Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 23.530-.600
(1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-52-1 to -14 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-801 to-815
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-6 (1953) (creates right of redemption); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 6.24.130-210 (1963 & Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-480 to -481 (1957 & Supp. 1969);
UTAH R. Civ. P. 69(f) (specifies manner in which redemption is exercised). These statutes generally
provide that the right of redemption may be exercised by paying the purchaser the purchase price
plus a specified rate of interest along with reimbursement for taxes, assessments, etc. A few statutes
provide an additional redemption period after foreclosure and before sale or strict foreclosure. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 3-1803 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 278.10(2) (Supp. 1969).
7. See Note, State Statutory Redemption Rights and the FederalHousing Administration:
Reconciliation of Real and Illusory Conflicts, 49 B.U.L. REv. 717 (1969).
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judicial sale, usually the mortgagee,' to bid fair market value for the
property, thereby giving maximum protection to the interests of the

mortgagor and his creditors

No federal statute or regulation has

determined, however, whether state redemption rights are available when
the United States forecloses on a federally insured mortgage. 10 In solving

similar problems," federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's
mandate in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States2 to fashion federal

rules of decision to govern relations arising from the operation of federal
laws. One court by applying this doctrine has allowed the adoption of
state property laws, such as recording acts and definitions of first
mortgage liens, when they can be used to advance federal policy
objectives.' 3 Moreover, others have required federal agencies to operate
within the framework of state law when local interests predominate. In
United States v. Yazell, 4 for example, the Supreme Court held that a

state coverture law controlled a married woman's liability on a loan
individually negotiated with the Small Business Administration. On the
other hand, local rules have usually been rejected by the courts when
8. The mortgagee is the buyer in over 99.3% of all public sales. Prather, A Realistic
Approach to Foreclosure, 14 Bus. LAW. 132, 135 (1958).
9. See 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 470 (1967); Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption From
ForeclosureSale-TheUniform MortgageAct, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825 (1925).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (Supp. IV, 1969) provides for a one-year redemption period after
foreclosure sale as a condition ofjurisdiction over the United States when it is a junior lienor. This
provision was made inapplicable to the insurance of mortgages under the National Housing Act by
12 U.S.C. § 1701(k) (1964).
11. E.g., United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (holding that federal rather than state law would control the
appointment of a receiver pending foreclosure on a FHA mortgage).
12. 318 US. 363 (1943) (federal rather than state law held to apply in the case of a forged
endorsement on a United States check).
13. See United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959) (court noted that it was commercially convenient to adopt state recording acts
and state definitions of first mortgage liens as the federal rule to govern FHA mortgages); cf.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 US. 363 (1943).
14. 382 US. 341 (1966) (6-3 decision). The Court held that Texas law would apply "in the
absence of federal statute, regulation or even any contract provision indicating that the state law
would be disregarded." Id. at 351-52. The Court emphasized, however, that the Texas law involved
governed an area of intense local interest, familial property rights and liabilities, and that this was a
highly individualized transaction that contained numerous references to Texas law. For a discussion
of the significance of this case see Note, FederalJurisdiction-"FederalCommon Law" vs. State
Law-United States v. Yazell. 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1021 (1966); Comment, Courts-State
Substantive Law Applies in Non-Diversity Actions When Local Interests Predominate-United
States v. Yazell, 65 MicH. L. Rev. 359 (1966); Comment, Conflict of Laws-Application of
FederalLaw-UnitedStates v. Yazell, 27 U. PITr. L. Rev. 712 (1966). The Ninth Circuit in Bumb
v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960), held that the SBA should comply with a California
"bulk sales" statute in perfecting its chattel mortgage. The court stated, however, that this statute
controlled only the acquisition of a valid security interest and did not "purport to regulate the
Id. at 737.
remedy of the mortgagee after default by the mortgagor....
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there has been a need for uniformity in the administration of national
federal mortgage insurance programs and when they have conflicted
with the federal policy of protecting the program against loss. 5 Thus,
applicable federal regulations providing for deficiency judgments in

mortgage foreclosures have been uniformly given controlling effect
despite contrary state anti-deficiency judgment statutes. 6 Some cases
have even granted deficiency judgments to the United States in the
absence of an applicable regulation or contract provision despite
contrary local law. 7 Likewise, express provisions for the appointment of

a receiver pending foreclosure in FHA insured mortgage contracts have
been held to override conflicting local laws.' 8 Several decisions have

given effect, however, to state redemption statutes where they did not
impair the effective administration of federal mortgage insurance

programs. 9
In the instant case, after disposing of preliminary matters,20 the

court noted that the dominant theme running throughout the applicable
cases 2' was the policy of protecting federal investments from local rules
15. See, e.g., United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied,361 US. 884 (1959).
16. E.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (loan guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration).
17. See United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (mortgage held by Veterans
Administration under vendee account loan program); United States v. Walker Park Realty, Inc.,
383 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1967) (FHA insured mortgage); Herlong-Sierra Homes, Inc. v. United States,
358 F.2d 300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966) (FHA insured mortgage).
18. United States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US.
901 (1964); United States v. Sylacauga Properties, Inc., 323 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Queen's Court Apts., Inc., 296 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. View Crest Garden
Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
19. See Madison Properties, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that
the debtor was not entitled to redemption under state law since he had not complied with state
procedure); Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966) (state law requiring
deduction of colleeted rents from the redemption price not applied to the United States when
property was redeemed from it after foreclosure on the FHA insured mortgage); United States v.
View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959)
(dictum that determination of loss of state redemption rights requires balancing the federal interest
against the local policy); United States v. West Willow Apts., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mich.
1965) (United States acquiesced in the inclusion of a redemptive period at the purchaser's request
since title could not be insured without it because of state law).
20. The court first concluded that the law governing the relationship between the United
States and the parties to the mortgage was federal. Hence, state law would have no application
unless adopted by Congress, the FHA, or the federal court to further federal policy.
21. Cases cited notes 16-18 supra. The court reasoned that cases relied on by appellee were
distinguishable since the Supreme Court had contrasted the individually negotiated loan in Yazell
with the FHA insured loan in United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963) (upholding a
personal judgment for the United States against a wife who signed the note despite a contrary state
law of coverture). Bumb was also distinguishable since it dealt with the manner of acquisition rather
than the enforcement of a security interest by the United States.
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limiting the effectiveness of available remedies. The court found that,

since only 26 states have redemption statutes, the policy of uniformity
would be negated by adopting local law.22 It also recognized that such

statutes increased the administrative burdens and the cost of federal
mortgage insurance programs. 23 Concluding that the redemption
statutes have failed to accomplish their purpose of forcing the mortgagee

or others to bid the full market value of the property at a foreclosure
sale, 24 the court held that state redemption statutes should not be

adopted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the United States on an
FHA insured mortgage. The dissent, arguing that it was presumptuous

for a federal court to eliminate state redemptive rights for the protection
of a federal program when Congress had never deemed it necessary to do

so, found a valid purpose for the redemption laws and no harm resulting
from their adoption.25
Although the instant court's decision is a logical extension of recent

decisional law," its rejection of state law is unfortunate. As the dissent
points out;. in its zeal to protect the federal program against immediate

financial loss and additional administrative burdens, the majority
overlooked the broader implications of federal policy in the mortgage

insurance field. Many federal programs in this area are designed to
stimulate individual home ownerships and, therefore, must be concerned
22. Periods of redemption in the statutes cited range from 6 months to 2 years. The court
said that the conditions of redemption and rules governing right to rents, repairs, and other matters
varied widely. It also noted a split of authority among the states as to whether the right of
redemption could be waived and over the mortgagee's right to recover the value of improvements
made during the redemption period. 425 F.2d at 364.
23. The Farmers Home Administration, Federal Housing Administration, and Veterans
Administration informed the court that imposition of the post-foreclosure-sale redemption periods
made the foreclosure remedy more costly and administratively time consuming. Id. at 365.
24. The court felt that third parties would be even more reluctant to bid and pay full market
value for the property knowing that they would not receive good title or full ownership rights until
expiration of the redemption period. Doubts as to the effectiveness of the statutes were reinforced by
the fact that redemption rights could be easily circumvented in some states through trust deeds with
power of sale. The court also noted that the FHA practice of bidding fair market value at the
foreclosure sale would satisfy local policy objectives of redemption statutes. Id. at 366.
25. Judge Ely argued that the majority had erred in its assumption that a third party would
come in to force the price up to market value at the foreclosure sale. The purpose of redemption
statutes was to operate as a future threat that would force the mortgagee to bid adequately at fair
market value, the mortgagor and junior lienors would achieve full satisfaction, thereby ending any
potential threat to the mortgagee. Id. at 369-70.
26. See cases cited notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
27. For instance, a mortgagor in a state with redemption provisions might find private
financing more desirable than an FHA loan. More importantly, however, contractors and suppliers
would be less willing to extend credit with fewer protections for their security interest as junior
lienors. 425 F.2d at 369.
28. For example, a National Home Ownership Foundation was established under the
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with protection of the mortgagor. Any federal housing program also is
concerned with stimulating construction; this policy would be furthered
by providing additional security to contractors and suppliers, whom the
redemption statutes similarly were designed to benefit. Government
agencies set up to accomplish these objectives should be prepared to
accept greater risks than the private lender.2 9 Furthermore, the

majority's conclusion that these statutes have failed in their essential
purpose has not been uniformly accepted by writers in the field of real

property.3 1 Moreover, since the FHA had recognized and operated

within the provisions of redemption statutes for many years, the
argument that the application of these statutes would diminish needed

national uniformity and greatly increase administrative burdens appears
particularly unconvincing. Thus, the instant court's decision, if followed,

will disrupt a system of safeguards erected by many states to mitigate the
potential harshness of foreclosure sales. It also has ominous implications

for other state laws designed to protect mortgagor investments and
enhance the security of junior lienors. These include provisions for
appraisal before sale and upset price adjustments. 31 The majority

opinion also runs counter to the traditional inclination of federal courts
to uphold state property laws because of the peculiarly local interests

involved.3 2 The decision sets a precedent for sacrificing legitimate state
interests to the expediency of federal programs although this
National Housing Act for the expansion of home ownership and housing opportunities for lower
income families. It was given the mandate of making use of existing public and private agencies and
programs in accomplishing its objectives. 12 U.S.C. § 1701(y) (Supp. IV, 1969).
29. The argument that the government should assume no risks in a program such as the FHA
seems specious in light of Congress' original intention that some risk be present. "Insurance for
these large scale rental projects has been aptly designated as the 'apartment boom floated on public
risk and private profit.'" S. REP. No. 1286,81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2093 (1950).
30.. For a positive discussion of the purpose and effect of these statutes see 3 R. POWELL.
supra note 9; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 9; Note, supra note 7. Contrary to the majority
opinion, trust deeds with power of sale have not nullified the effect of redemption statutes since
foreclosure by action is still the most commonly used remedy.See6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
16:204 (J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra note 9, at
468. Nevertheless, statutory
redemption has its critics. E.g., G. OSBOURNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 8, at 2426 (1951); Murray, Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of Home Financing,28 WASH. L. REV. 39
(1953). See also Prather, supra note 8.
31. Some jurisdictions require an appraisal before sale and withhold judicial confirmation of
the sale unless the sale price is at least two-thirds of the appraisal. Upset price adjustment involves
the reopening of bidding if a higher offer is actually received after the foreclosure sale. 3 R. POWELL,
supranote 9, at 466.
32. E.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (state law allowing a
mineral lease to be effected only by written agreement held controlling); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that materialmen's liens that had attached under state law must
be honored); cf., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272 (1882)
(state homestead exemption held applicable in spite of detriment to federal interest).

1390

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL.

23

development is neither expressly authorized by a federal statute or
regulation nor demonstrated by compelling need. This approach has

potential ramifications in any case where a real or illusory conflict
between state law and a federal program arises. It is submitted that a
more constructive approach would be to adopt state law whenever

significant local interests are involved in the absence of any
irreconciliable conflict with long-range federal policy objectives.

Public Welfare-Social Security-State Maximum Grant
Regulation of AFDC Payments Consistent with Both Social
Security Act and Equal Protection Clause
Appellees initiated a class action' seeking to declare invalid and
permanently enjoin enforcement of Maryland's "maximum grant"

regulation, which places an absolute limit of 250 dollars per month2 on
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) grants. Under statecomputed "standards of need,"' 3 the families comprising the class,
because of their large size, had subsistence needs that substantially
exceeded the maximum grants they received under the regulation.,

Appellees contended that this maximum grant limitation violates the
equal protection clause by discriminating against them merely because

of the size of their families. They also maintained that the regulation is
contrary to a fundamental purpose of the AFDC programs as well as the
i. The suit was brought by 3 parents individually and on behalf of their minor children and
all other parents, relatives, or minor children similarly situated. The defendants were officials of
Maryland's Department and Board of Public Welfare. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450
(D. Md. 1968).
2. Maryland Manual of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Part I1, Rule 200, § VI I, I (the $250 per
month maximum has been promulgated for eligible families of certain counties; for remaining
counties there is a $240 maximum grant).
3. The Maryland "standard of need" is a schedule list of monetary need for families units of
one to 10 persons. Operatively, it serves as a subsistence table, and any family having a standard of
need less than the maximum grant receives the full amount of grant suggested by the standard. In
practice the subsistence needs of a family of 6 are fully met, but no additional payments are made to
any additional eligible dependent children (i.e., a fifth or sixth child depending upon whether one or
both parents are within the assistance unit). Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 509-10 n.2
(1970).
4. Appellee Linda Williams lives with her 8 children. Under the "standard of need," their
requirement for subsistence is $296.15 per month. The other named parties are members of one
family living together with a standard of need requirement of $331.50. Williams v. Dandridge, 297
F. Supp. 450,453 (D. Md. 1968).
5. The operative effect of the maximum grant, argued the appellees, is to create an incentive
to "farm out" the younger members of large families to eligible relatives. This, they maintained,
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Social Security Act, which provides "... that aid to dependent children
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals.' 6 Appellants defended the regulation as a legitimate,
recognized, 7 and necessary" exercise of the latitude given the state to
allocate AFDC resources. A three-judge district court found the

maximum grant regulation unconstitutional as an arbitrary and
irrational classification precipitating different treatment of dependent
children who are equally in need.9 On direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. A maximum grant regulation employed
in the allocation of AFDC grants is consistent with requirements of both
the Social Security Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

The AFDC program was conceived during the Depression as a part
of the Social Security Act of 1935.10 Although it was financed largely by
the federal government on a matching fund basis," its operation was
subverts the express legislative purpose of the AFDC program to "encourage the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives ....
"42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969)
(emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1935) (stating original goal:
"Through cash grants adjusted to the needs of the family it is possible to keep young children with
their mother in their own home ... ") (emphasis added).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added). The class members
maintained that the regulation is in patent violation of this requirement since it denied benefits to the
youngest eligible infants of large families despite the fact that they are as "dependent" as their older
siblings under the definition of "dependent child." See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); 42
U S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
7. Appellants pointed to the fact that the Maryland maximum payment regulation had been
in force in various forms since 1947. Moreover, they noted that the Secretary had approved the
more than 20 state maximum grant systems. 397 US. at 481-82. See also Hearingson H.R. 5710
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 118 (1967);
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STATE MAXIMUMS AND OTHER METHODS OF

LIMITING MONEY PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS OF SPECIAL TYPES OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 3

(1962).

8. Of the 32,504 families receiving AFDC assistance, the Maryland Department of Social
Services estimated that 2,537 families would be affected by the removal of the maximum grant
limitation. Were the regulation stricken, because of limited appropirations for AFDC, the State
would be forced to employ a percentage limitation equally to all recipients. The effect would be that
all recipients would receive less than the amount suggested for them by the "standard of need." At
the time of the suit, the appellees' class represented only one-thirteenth of AFDC families who were
receiving less than their standard of need. 397 U S. at 473 n.10.
9. The district court initially predicated its holding on the regulation's violation of § 402 of
the Social Security Act, 42 U S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969), as well as the equal protection
clause. Pursuant to FED. R. Cwv. P. 52(b), 59, the court granted defendant's motion in part by
writing a supplemental opinion basing its holding exclusively on violation of the equal protection
clause. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450,459 (D. Md. 1968) (supplemental opinion).
10. Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U S.C.
§§ 601-1392 (Supp. IV, 1969).
11. The federal government supplies five-sixths of the overall amount spent per recipient up to
$18, plus one-half of amount from $18 to $32. See42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(l)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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premised on "cooperative federalism.' ' 2 Under this scheme the funds
were administered in acc6rdance with state-authored AFDC plans
approved by the Social Security Board. 3 In the years immediately
following the program's inception, states enjoyed extensive freedom in

tailoring their plans to meet their own desires and needs. 4 Over the last
two decades, however, AFDC has undergone substantial expansion not

only in coverage 15 but also in the extent of statutory limitation on state
administrative capacity." Among other restraints, Congress enacted
section 402(a)(I 0),'7 which prevented the previous state practice of using
"waiting lists" to limit the number of recipients. When coupled with
interpretations of legislative intent favoring broad coverage," these

limitations raised serious doubt about the statutory scope of state
latitude in administering AFDC grants. Moreover, increased application

of equal protection in the area of poverty and welfare," as well as
emerging judicial recognition of new fundamental interests, 0 further
restricted state welfare regulations. If a state elected to establish a
12. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A,
44A-60 (1957) (authorizing the Maryland Department of Public Welfare to carry on a
cooperative welfare program with the federal government).
13. State plans are now approved by the Secretary of HEW. For approval the plans must:
(1)be mandatory on all political subdivisions of the State; (2) provide for state financial contributions; (3) establish a single state agency to administer the plan; (4) provide for administrative hearing for an aggrieved recipient or potential recipient; and (5) have no residence requirement of more
than one year. 42 U.S.C. § 601-02(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). See also U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON

§§

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

REPORT ON STATUTORY

AND

ADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROLS

6 (1964).
14. States, for example, were able to proscribe grants for children whose mothers cohabitated
with an able-bodied man. King v. Smith, 392 US. 309 (1968). Others required that a home
must be "suitable" before its members became eligible for benefits. E.g.. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:233 (Supp. 1970). See also 22 VAND. L. REv. 219 (1968).
15. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (Supp. IV, 1969) (adds family planning service);
id. § 607(a)(2) (extends coverage to embrace children whose parents are unemployed rather than
incapacitated or absent from home); id. § 608 (extends benefits to include children in child-care
centers).
16. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969) (prevents states from creating waiting
lists); id. § 602(a)(23) (requires states to make adjustments in standard of need tables and
maximum grant regulations commensurate with changes in living costs); Bureau of Public
Assistance, Social Security Administration, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, State Letter
No. 452 (1961) (Secretary of HEW's statement that states may not impose eligibility conditions on
the basis of "suitability" of a child's home).
17. Social Security Act § 321(a), ch. 809, 64 Stat. 550 (1950), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
18. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
19. Compare Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (concurring opinion)
(defining poverty as "constitutionally an irrelevant") with Levy v. Louisiana, 391 US. 68 (1968).
20. E.g.. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma ev rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942)
(right to procreate).
ASSOCIATED WITH FEDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
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program of public assistance, for example, it could not altogether
exclude an arbitrary portion of its eligible citizenry from the program's
offerings without violating the equal protection clause. 21 When applied to
maximum grant regulations, the full impact of the equal protection
clause cannot be accurately discerned until it is determined which of two
possible tests should be employed. The traditional "rational basis" test
requires a showing of invidious and "palpably arbitarary" classification
devoid of any reasonably conceivable rationality. The application of
this test has been confined primarily to cases challenging the
constitutionality of business and industrial regulations. z3 Whenever a
complainant can demonstrate that a "fundamental interest" is
threatened, however, a more stringent equal protection standard is
invoked whereby a classification reasonably related to a public purpose
and free of invidious discrimination may still be held unconstitutional.?
In applying the "fundamental interest" test, courts weigh "the benefits
flowing from pursuit of the state's objective against the detriment
resulting from impairment of a basic personal interest." 2 In 1969, the
Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision suggesting that a state
26
AFDC regulation should be tested by the "rational basis" standard,
but it later indicated that public welfare is a fundamental need of
indigents,27 thus intimating a need for the more stringent balancing test.
One of the pivotal questions in determining which test should be
employed is whether children born into AFDC families already receiving
a maximum amount are altogether excluded from benefits or whether
they merely cause a proportionate dispersion of the grant whereby all
children in the family receive less but none are totally deprived. The
resolution of this issue would have direct bearing on the invidiousness of
the classification as well as on the requirement of section 402(a)(10) that
benefits be paid to "all eligible individuals." When confronted with this
precise question in Williams v. Dandridge,2s a federal district court held
21. King v. Smith, 392 US. 309 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US.
12 (1956).
22. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 US. 199,216 (1914).
23. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 34 US. 457 (1957); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 US. 552 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61 (1911).
24. Developments in the Law--Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1132 (1968-69).
25.

Id.

26. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 US. 323
(1969).
27. Cf.Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254, 264 (1970) (stating that: "For qualified recipients,
welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Thus the
crucial factor in this context. . . is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.").
28. 297 F.Supp.450 (D. Md. 1968).
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that the Maryland maximum grant excluded last born children and
thereby violated both section 402(a)(10)2 1 and the equal protection
clause. Subsequently, maximum grant regulations in three other states
were invalidated on the authority of the Maryland decision.30 Although
these decisions failed to indicate which equal protection test was being
employed, 3 ' they nonetheless evinced new impetus in the trend towards
broader coverage and tighter restrictions on state regulations of AFDC
benefits.
Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court had never been
confronted by a challenge of state maximum grant regulations. In
approaching the problem, the Court first considered whether the
Maryland regulation was compatible with the requirement of section
402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act that reasonably prompt aid be
furnished to "all eligible individuals. ' 32 In this regard, the Court held
that since the focus of the Act was on the family unit rather than on
individual dependents,3 eligible children born into families receiving a
maximum grant were not excluded from coverage but were merely
forced to share the same benefits with other household members.
Although the operative effect of the regulation was, therefore, to
diminish the lot of the entire family on a per capita basis, the Court ruled
that so long as some aid was provided to all eligible individuals no
violation of the statute had occurred. The Court further observed that
the Maryland regulation was a recognized practice"4 incident to the
latitude given the states in selecting methods best suited for disbursing a
limited AFDC budget.3 Turning to the constitutional issue, the Court
29. 42 US.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
30. Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Me. 1969); Dews v. Henry, 297 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ariz. 1969).
31. In fact, the-courts showed little awareness that the 2 tests existed. Two courts appeared to
use the traditional standard but cited authority that used the stringent test. Westberry v. Fisher, 297
F. Supp. 1109 (D. Me. 1969); Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV, 1969).
33. 397 U.S. at477-78.
34. In this regard, the Court quoted 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. IV, 1969): "[The State
shall] provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of
individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since amounts were
established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aidpaid to families will
have been proportionatelyadjusted." 397 US. at 482 (emphasis added). See also King v. Smith,
392 US. 309, 334 (1968).
35. In asserting the State's power the Court was refusing to recognize appellee's "farming
out" argument. See note 5 supra. The Court further buttressed its conclusion by noting that even if
there were "farming out" of children, the AFDC requirement that a child must live with one of
several enumerated relatives (42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. IV, 1969)) assured that the "farming out"
of children would be done within the family circle. 397 US. at 480 ("The kinship tie may be
attenuated but it cannot be destroyed").
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first noted that the rational basis test should be utilized in evaluating
AFDC classifications under the equal protection clause. In deference to
the proposition that the fourteenth amendment gives the Court no power
to impose its views of wise economic or social policy upon the states, the
Court refrained from examining the state's justifications and deemed it
sufficient that there were rationally supportable predicates for the
regulation, including its incentive to family planning, its encouragement
for those affected to seek employment, and its potential for securing full
subsistence needs for smaller families.3 To the three dissenting judges
the reasoning of the majority was less than palatable. Mr. Justice
Douglas contended that the child and not the family is the heart of the
AFDC program, that limitations based on family size violate the
fundamental purposes of the program, 37 and that maximum grants did
not receive either tacit or express approval of Congress or the Secretary
of HEW. 38 Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan,
favored the use of a more stringent donstituiional inquiry 3 and expressed
particular concern for the Court's "emasculation of the equal protection
clause as a principle applicable to the area of social welfare. .
There can be little doubt that the instant decision has come as a
great surprise to many who, prior to its appeal, had anticipated it as
another stage in an expanding evolution of AFDC benefits. To the
contrary, the immediate impact of the decision has been to check, at
least in the area of maximum grants, the shrinkage of state freedom to
restrict disbursement of welfare grants. In order to achieve this, the
Court has suggested that the "family unit" rather than the individual
child is the focus of legislative intent. This conclusion seems tenuous
when considered in light of Congress' continued expansion of AFDC.
The nature of these extensions radiates the distinct desire to provide
benefit to each needy child regardless of surrounding circumstances over
which it has no control.4' The Court itself has participa : in realizing
36. The Court noted that if the maximum grants were eliminated all recipient families would
receive less than their subsistence needs, whereas now only 2,537 families (one-thirteenth of total
number of recipients) receive less. 397 U.S. at 480 n.10; See also note 3 supra.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(14) (Supp. IV, 1969) (requiring that state AFDC plans must
provide for the development of a program for "each child"). Seealso S. REP. No. 628, 74th Congs.,
Ist Sess., 16-17 (1935): "All parts of theSocial Security Act are in a very real sense measures for the
security of children. . . . In addition, however, there is great need for special safeguards for many
underprivileged children. Children are in many respects the worst victims of the depression."
38. See note44 infra and accompanying text.
39. In addition both were in agreement with Mr. Justice Douglas' statutory arguments. 397

US. at 508.
40. Id.
41.

See statutes cited note 16 supra.
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this goal.42 In fact, it has in certain cases recognized that the nature of
the family unit should not exclude a child from coverage.4 3 While the
importance of the family unit is of recognized concern, it should be
significant only as a conduit for best securing the welfare of the needy
child and not as a restrictive tool. The instant decision, however, has
sustained a system that restricts benefits solely on the basis of family size
and penalizes dependent children of such families because of an accident
of birth. The Court has argued that maximum grants represent a
recognized practice; however, the conclusion seems unjustified in light of
the HEW Secretary's reference to maximum grants as "arbitrary,"
oppressive of large families, and resulting in "patently different
treatment of individuals." 44 Moreover, since federal AFDC
contributions are determined by the number of eligible individuals and
not family units,45 the effect of applying a maximum grant regulation is
to increase the proportional share of the burden being borne by the
federal government. In the case of a Maryland family with more than
eleven members, the state actually makes a profit because it receives
more money for support of that family than it spends." It is difficult to
believe that Congress intended such a result.
The element in this decision that should cause the greatest concern,
however, is the Court's treatment of equal protection. Although by
invoking the "rational basis" test the Court has ended the confusion as
to which equal protection test is applicable to maximum grant
provisions, in so doing it has lumped together two dramatically
dissimilar types of legislation. As the Court admitted, there is a
significant difference betweefn "state regulation of business or industry"
and "the most basic needs of impoverished human beings." 4' Despite
this admission, however, the Court refused to recognize that a personal
interest calling for a more permissive review is involved in cases
concerning the AFDC program. That this conclusion will mantle the
meaning of fundamental interest with a disconcerting imprecision
cannot be denied. How can the Court consistently acknowledge a basic
right to travel," to vote,49 and to procreates° while denying the existence
42.
43.
44.

King v. Smith, 392 US. 309 (1968).
E.g., id.
397 U.S.515, n.8. But see note 7 supra.

45. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

397 U.S. at 512-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
397 U.S. at485.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533 (1964).
Skinner v. Oklahoma ctrel.Williamson, 316 US.535 (1942).
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of a fundamental right to subsist?51 Trapped by a doctrinaire two-test
construct the Court has threatened to reduce the determination of
"fundamental interest" to a completely subjective evaluation.
Moreover, it has missed the opportunity to fully consider the basic issues
created by state regulation of AFDC grants. Under the "rational basis"
test if any set of facts that would sustain the classification's rationality
can be reasonably conceived, itsexistence must be assumed rather than
analyzed. 52 Had the Court not felt. the need for such restraint, it could
have evaluated the legitimate interests of both the state and AFDC

recipients with a more realistic sensitivity. For example, it could have
inquired more deeply into the effect of Maryland's finite AFDC budget;
or it could have considered the true effectiveness of the maximum grant
as a panacea for collateral concerns such as family planning and
inducement to seek employment.0 For these reasons it is hoped that the

instant decision will be remembered as an aberration rather than a
permanent departure.

Selective Service Law-Conscientious Objectors-Deeply Held
Moral, Ethical, or Religious Beliefs Satisfy Requirements of
"Religious Training and Belief' Exemption
Petitioner was convicted of refusing to be inducted into the United

States armed forces' after he was denied an exemption under section 6(j)
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. 2 This statute
51. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall captured the irony of this contradiction. "It is
certainly difficult to believe that a person whose survival is at stake would be comforted by the
knowledge that his 'fundamental' rights are preserved intact." 397 U.S. at 521 n.14. For a full
discussion of the "right" to welfare assistance see Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to
Receive; the Obligationto Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 451 (1968); Harvith, FederalEqual Protection
and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210 (1967).
52. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1080-81
(1969).
53. In this regard, Maryland's argument of collateral incentives for family members to seek
gainful employment seems tenuous since the inducement would apply only to the one-thirteenth of
all recipients affected by the maximum grant. See note 8 supra. Moreover, only 6.5% of all AFDC
families contain an employable person. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 468 (D. Md.
1968) (supplemental opinion).
1. Petitioner was convicted in 1966 of violating the Universal Military Service and Training
Act. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 12,62 Stat. 612.
2. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456j)
(Supp. IV, 1969). This section provides in part: "Nothing in this title shall be construed to require
any person to be subject to combatant training and service. . .who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
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exempts from military service any person who, because of religious

training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participating in war in
any form. Although lacking a formal religious affiliation, 3 petitioner
contended that his sincere belief in the value of human life and his total
repugnance to killing another human being were sufficiently "religious"
to qualify him for an exemption under the statute. 4 Petitioner further

contended that the statute would violate the establishment clause of the
first amendment if his beliefs were not within its scope. 5 Respondent, the

United States, maintained that the petitioner was not entitled to an
exemption because his objections were not based upon "religious

training and belief" but upon a "merely personal moral code,", which
was expressly excluded by the statute as a basis for exemption. The

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with
respondent, 8 affirmed the convictionY On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. A Selective Service registrant is entitled

to an exemption from military service as a conscientious objector if he is
opposed to war in any form because of sincere ethical or moral
3. A Department of Justice hearing officer interviewed petitioner and found no "belief in the
existence of God or a Supreme Being.' Welsh v. United States, 404 F2d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 1968).
Section 66) specifically defines "religious training and belief" as an individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being. See note 7 infra. Petitioner later requested that his original answer to the
question be stricken and that the question be left open. Although raised in a religious home,
petitioner did not continue childhood religious ties and did not belong to a religious group.
Moreover, petitioner was unable to sign the statement, "I am, by reason of my religious training
and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," as printed. Petitioner
signed only after carefully striking the words "religious training and." 404 F.2d at 1080.
4. Petitioner held deep conscientious scruples against participating in war, he believed that
killing in war was "wrong, unethical, and immoral, and his conscience forbade [his] taking part in
such an evil practice." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S., 333,337 (1970). In his original application
for exemption, he wrote: "I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore,
I will not injure or kill another human being" Id. at 343.
5. Petitioner contended that drawing a distinction between theistic or nontheistic religious
beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other was not compatible with the establishment
clause.
6. 398 US. at 342. This term was synonymous with an individual's political, sociological, or
philosophical convictions.
7. As it applied to this case, the statute further stated: "Religious training and belief in this
connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."' Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62
Stat. 612.
8. Petitioner's application for exemption was denied because the appeal board of the Selective
Service System and the Department of Justice hearing officer "could find no religious basis for the
registrant's conscientious objector claim." 404 F.2d at 1082.
9. The court noted, however, that petitioner's beliefs were held with the strength of more
traditional religious convictions. 404 F.2d at 108 1. There was never any doubt about his sincerity or
the depth of his convictions. 398 U S. at 337.
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convictions held with the strength of religious belief. Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Although the courts have not recognized a constitutional right of
exemption from military service based upon religious beliefs, 0 Congress

traditionally" has exempted religious objectors from the draft.'2 It has
failed to provide exemptions, however, for persons with ethical,

philosophical, br political objections. 3 The Selective Service Act of'
1917,"1 for example, extended exemptions only to members of recognized
religious sects whose creeds prohibited participation in war. 5 In 1940,
Congress mollified the exemption to include individuals who object to
participation in war because of "religious training and belief."' 6 This

broad language left the courts with a free hand to define the word
"religious" and thereby determine the scope of the exemption. An

intercircuit dialogue subsequently developed between the Second and
Ninth Circuits. In United States v. Kauten 7 the Second Circuit

suggested in dictum18 that the term "religious" included a man's
response to his conscience as well as his response to his god. The Ninth
10. E.g., Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U S. 605 (1931) (rejecting the contention that exemption for religious conscientious
objectors is required by the free exercise clause of the Constitution); George v. United States, 196
F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952). But see Freeman, Exemptions from Civil
Responsibilities,20 OHIo ST. L.J. 437 (1959).
!1. The Draft Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9, exempted conscientious objectors
affiliated with established religious organizations whose articles of faith forbade participation in
war in any form. For a history of conscientious objector exemptions in the United States see
Conklin, Conscientious ObjectorProvisions: A View in Light of Torcaso v. Watkins. 51 GEO. L.J.
252, 256-76 (1963); Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the
Current Conscientious Objector Exemption from Military Service, 13 J.PUB. L. 16, 25-38 (1964).
For a broader historical perspective see W. KELLOGG, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 2-25 (1919);
M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE; THE AMERICAN STATE AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 1-44 (1952).
12. The right of government to demand universal military service has been upheld over a wide
range of objections. E.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (involuntary
servitude); Id. at 389 (illegal delegation of federal power); Id. at 389-90 (establishment of religion).
Refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States is a statutory crime. See
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
13. Seenote 11 supra.
14. ActofMay 18, 1917, ch. 15,40 Stat. 76.
15. Id., § 4,at 78. These sects were limited to pacifist groups such as the Society of Friends,
Church of the Brethren, and the Mennonites. For additional religious pacifist organizations during
the First World War, see Note, The Conscientious Objector Under the Selective Service Act of
1940, 15 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 235,236 n.20 (1941).
16. Selective Training and Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
17. 133 F.2d703 (2dCir. 1943).
18. Id. at 705. The test enunciated in Kauten was dictum because the complainant was not
granted an exemption; however, itwas followed immediately inUnited States cc rel. Phillips v.
Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2dCir. 1943).
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9 that the word
Circuit, however, held in Berman v. United States"
"religious" was intended to exclude the ethical objector, no matter how
strong his convictions, unless his beliefs were based upon some concept
of a diety.? In 1948 Congress sought to clarify its intent and the scope of

the exemption in a new act 2' by defining "religious training and belief"

as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation," but excluding

"a merely personal moral code."2 By 1961,21 the Supreme Court had
decided two casesu that cast doubt upon the constitutionality of this
definition.2- The Court first held that the legislative power to deny a

privilege does not imply a commensurate power to grant that privilege
on unconstitutional grounds.26 Subsequently, the Court held that a
statute that discriminates in favor of theistic religions against nontheistic
religions or in favor of the religious against the non-religious is
unconstitutional.2 7 The Berman holding was constitutionally
inconsistent with these decisions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
upheld the statutory test and avoided the possible conflict with the

establishment clause of the first amendment. The Court in United States
v. Seegert s interpreted the statute to require that a given belief occupy a

place in the life of its possessor parallel to that occuped by the Supreme
19. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
20. "It is our opinion that the expression 'by reason of religious training and belief' is plain
language, and was written into the statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing between a . .
high moralistic philosophy and one based upon an authority higher and beyond any wordly one."
Id. at 380.
21. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 66), 62 Stat. 12-13. The report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee recommending adoption stated: "This section reenacts substantially the same
provisions as were found in the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious
training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to . . . military
service... !'S. REP. No. 1268,80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
22. This definition is taken from parts of 2 judicial decisions: the first clause of the definition
is from Justice Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931); the
restrictive second half is from Berman, 156 F.2d at 380.
23. Following the 1948 legislation, the courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits construed the
statute in accord with the Berman decision. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 US. 930 (1963); United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955).
24. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
25. Prior to these cases the constitutionality of the statute had been unsuccessfully challenged.
The courts had reasoned that, since exemptions are acts of grace, Congress may limit even by
unreasonable conditions those privileges that it may take away completely. George v. United States,
196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952).
26. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); accord,Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
27. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); accord,Welsh v, United States, 404 F.2d 1078
(9th Cir. 1968) (dissent) (as against the establishment clause of the first amendment).
28. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In Seeger the Supreme Court ruled that the conscientious objector
exemption extended to a registrant who characterized his beliefs as "religious" but who did not
express a belief in a Supreme Being.

1970]

RECENT CASES

Being in the life of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.29 In
attempting to distinguish between moral and religious beliefs and at the
same time to expand the scope of exemptions, the Seeger decision created

confusion in the lower courts as to the status of the ethical objector. 0
Moreover, the constitutionality of the statutory exemption remained
undecided. 31 In 1967, Congress responded to the Seeger decision by
32
deleting the reference to a Supreme Being from the statute.
After declining to address the constitutional issues in the instant
case, the Courtl noted that a Selective Service registrant who denies that
his beliefs are "religious" may not be aware of the broad scope of the

term "religious" as defined in section 6(j). Finding the Seeger definition
of "religious"

to relate entirely to the role and function of an

individual's beliefs, the Court concluded that the petitioner's beliefs
qualified as religious under the statute. The Court reasoned that the

beliefs could not then be categorized as a "merely personal moral code"
kegardless of their origins. Following the Seeger rationale in considering
the relationship of the registrant's belief to his scheme of life, the Court

concluded that a registrant is entitled to an exemption as a conscientious
objector when his objection to serving in war is based on sincere ethical
beliefs held with the strength of religious conviction. The concurring
opinion of Justice Harlan renounced the subjective reasoning of the

Seeger decision.34 Finding limitation of the exemption to theistic

believers to be unconstitutional, Justice Harlan agreed that the Court
29. Id. at 166.
36. See United States v. Shacter, 293 F.Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968) (an attempt to apply the
rule to an atheist); Note, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1734 (1969).
31. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
32. Congress amended the statute to read: "As used in this subsection, the term 'religious
training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code." 50 U.S.C. App. § 456j) (Supp. IV, 1968).
The legislative intent behind the 1967 Act is not clear but there is some evidence of
Congressional intent to narrow the effect of Seeger:
The Senate conferees . . . concurred in the desire of the House language to more narrowly
construe the basis for classifying registrants as 'conscientious objectors.'...
"The Senate conferees were of the opinion that Congressional intent in this area would be
clarified by the inclusion of language indicating that the term 'religious training and belief' as used
in this section of the law does not include 'essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
or a merely personal moral code."' CONFERENCE REP. No. 346,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1360 (1967)
(emphasis added). The House conferees concurred in the Senate recommendation and the
amendment was passed.
33. Mr. Justice Black spoke for the majority. He was joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion. Mr. Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in
the case.
34. Mr. Justice Harlan joined in the majority opinion in Seeger, which he here acknowledges
as a "mistake." 398 U S. at 344.
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should extend the coverage of the statute to include those aggrieved by

the exclusion rather than to declare it a complete nullity., He argued,
however, that the Court should rewrite the statute, by judicial
patchwork, so that it would conform with constitutional principles.
The instant decision, in effect, eliminates the distinction between the
traditionally religious and non-religious and renders the statutory
language denying exemptions on the basis of personal moral codes
meaningless. The Court was faced with three alternatives in the
disposition of petitioner's interests: (1) to extend the exemption to

objectors like the petitioner, (2) to declare the conscientious objector
exemption unconstitutional, or (3) to dismiss the petition on the basis of
lack of standing and preserve the status quo. The Court's decision to
expand the statutory exemption unquestionably embodies the best
alternative and the most practical solution, even at the expense of an
obviously tortured interpretation of the statutory language. Moreover,
this strained interpretation appears justified when compared with the end

results of the other alternatives.3 It is submitted that a balancing of the
interests at stake will support the Court's solution. Analyzing the
operation of the Selective Service System in the United States today, it is
apparent that conscientious objectors are not a major factor in the draft,
with only one-half of one percent of all draft-age males classified as
conscientious objectors.3 7 In addition, Selective Service officials
anticipate that the instant decision will not have a substantial impact on
the operation of the draft.3 Thus, the government's interest in raising an
35. Mr. Justice Harlan looked to the history of the legislation and found that the statute
clearly expressed an intent to limit the draft exemption to theistic believers, which, in his judgment,
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment, and was, therefore, beyond the power of
Congress. Since the petitioner would otherwise go remediless, however, Justice Harlan advocated
that the Court utilize its presumed grant of power to decide whether it is more nearly in accord with
the wishes of Congress to eliminate the statute completely or to render it constitutional. The
dissenting opinion of Justice White also found petitioner to be within that class expressly excluded
from exemption by the statute. Thus the dissent pointed out that the petitioner lacked standing to
raise the constitutional issue, and that, consequently, the conviction should be affirmed.
36. To have avoided a decision on petitioner's claims by finding that he lacked standing to
assert them would have left petitioner and those similarly situated with no remedy for a grievance
which, in the opinion of the majority, merited relief. In addition, such a disposition of the case
would leave section 6() practically immune from constitutional attack. To declare the entire
conscientious objector exemption unconstitutional would likewise be manifestly unjust to an even
larger number of individuals. For the possible ramifications of this latter course, see The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 116 (1965).
37. Selective Service officials state that there are only about 40,000 conscientious objectors
out of more than 9,000,000 draft-aged men at the present time. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1970, at I, col.
38.

Id.
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armed force39 should not be significantly affected by the broadening of
the conscientious objector exemption. More importantly, the interests of
the petitioner and others having similar moral and social values worthy
of preservation 0 will hereafter be protected. Perhaps the most immediate
impact of the instant case has been felt by draft boards. In response to
this decision, the National Headquarters for the Selective Service
System mailed to all boards new guidelines for conscientious objector
classifications. 4 ' The memorandum instructs the boards that "religious
training and belief as used in law may include solely moral or ethical
beliefs." 4 It' 43 also instructs the boards that the primary test to be used is
"sincerity.
These new guidelines represent a desirable operative effect
of the instant case. The decision not only has eliminated the need for
religious credentials, which have in the past caused the denial of
exemption to deserving applicants, but it also has developed the only
honest test for conscientious objection-a sincere and compelling
aversion to the taking of another human life. The greatest shortcoming
of the decision lies in its failure to take a direct approach to the
constitutional issues presented, which not only necessitated the strained
interpretation but also raised the issue of whether this decision has
effectively removed the substance of a first amendment challenge or
merely put it in abeyance. The decision, consequently, has created
considerable confusion. The Director of the Selective Service System,
Curtis W. Tarr, has complained that the 4,001 local boards charged with
the administration of the decision are more confused than ever as to who
may qualify for conscientious objector status4 Perhaps if Mr. Justice
H arlan's suggestion were implemented, a judicially rewritten statute
would provide a more intelligible basis for administrative guidelines in
the Selective Service System. It is submitted that difficult problems still
remain; for example, what is the status of the registrant who objects to a
particular war or type of war rather than to all wars? This question is
39. The overriding objective of the Selective Service is "to raise an army speedily and
efficiently." Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549,553 (1944).
40. "A state that preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the
individual will in fact ultimately lose it by the process." Stone, The Conscientious Objector,21
COL. UNIV. Q. 254,269 (1919).
41. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 107 (July 6, 1970).
42. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
43. Id. The memorandum further provides: "A registrant who is eligible for conscientious
objection on the basis of moral, ethical, or religious beliefs is not excluded from the exemption

simply because those beliefs may influence his views concerning the nation's domestic or foreign
policies." Furthermore, the boards are not free to reject beliefs because they
"incomprehensible."
44. TIME, June 29, 1970, at 40, col. 2; Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1970, at 8, col. 2.

are
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posed in two cases4 5 to which certiorari has recently been granted.

Hopefully, the Court will take the forthcoming opportunity to clear up
the rhetorical cloud now shrouding the concept of conscientious

objection.

Taxation-Corporate Distributions-Meaningful Reduction of
Shareholder's Proportionate Interest Required for Section
302(b)( 1) Stock Redemptions Regardless of Business Purpose
Taxpayer,' an organizer and principal shareholder of a closely held
corporation, brought suit for refund of federal income taxes paid under a
deficiency assessment. To provide the capital necessary for the
corporation to qualify for a loan, taxpayer purchased preferred stock
that was to be redeemed at par when the loan was repaid. 2 The taxpayer
and his family then became sole owners of the corporation. When the
stock was subsequently redeemed, taxpayer claimed he was entitled to
capital gains treatment on the proceeds he received because the
redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
302(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.3 The Commissioner contended
that under the attribution rules of section 318(a),4 taxpayer was deemed
45. United States v. Gillette, 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 90 S. Ct. 2236 (1970) (No.
1170); Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 90 S. Ct. 2256 (1970) (No.
1669).
1. All references to "taxpayer" are to Maclin P. Davis. His wife was also a party since joint
returns were filed. Taxpayer and another organized the corporation. The other organizer received
one-half of the voting stock while taxpayer and his wife each held one-quarter interests.
2. An additional $25,000 working capital was necessary for the corporation to qualify for a
Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan. The other organizer, while either unwilling or unable to
increase his investment, insisted on retaining 50% of the voting power. Therefore, only 2 methods of
providing the necessary capital were considered: (1)preferred stock and (2) subordinated debentures
in exchange for a loan. The former was selected since it was more attractive on the corporate
balance sheet.
3. lrr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302:
"(a) GENERAL RuLE.-f a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of § 317(b)),
and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a
distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
"(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVIDENDS.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a):
"(a) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter to which the rules
contained in this section are expressly made applicable-
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to own all the corporation's stock and consequently, the redemption was
a pro rata distribution taxable as a dividend under section 301.5 Taxpayer denied the applicability of the attribution rules to determinations
of dividend equivalency under section 302(b)(I) 6 and contended that in
any event a pro rata distribution was not essentially equivalent to a dividend when made pursuant to a valid business purpose. 7 The district
court 8 held the attribution rules applicable, but sustained the taxpayer's
business purpose argument and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. When a cor-

porate distribution in redemption of stock does not result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest, it is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1). United
States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
The Internal Revenue Code provides generally that corporate

distributions of property to shareholders are taxable as dividends to the
extent of earnings and profits. 10 Exceptions to this general rule are found

in section 302, which concerns certain distributions in redemption of
stock." Under section 302(a), a distribution in redemption is treated as a
(1) MEMBERS OF FAMILY.-

(A) IN GENERAL-An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated from the individual
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents."
If applied here at the time of redemption, taxpayer would be considered the constructive owner of all
the outstanding stock.
5. 1NT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 301(a), (c) provide that distributions made by a corporation
to a stockholder with respect to his stock shall be treated as gross income to the extent they are
dividends.
6. Taxpayer argued that the provisions of § 302(c)(1), making the attribution rules
applicable to § 302, operate only when the ownership of stock is in issue and not in § 302(b)(1)
dividend equivalency determinations, since, unlike the other subdivisions of § 302(b), no mention of
stock ownership is made in that subsection. Thus, it was argued that constructive ownership is not
properly a part of the factual inquiry into the effect of distributions required by § 302(b)(1).
7. Taxpayer also contended that the return of capital is not "income" within the meaning of
the sixteenth amendment and that under the doctrine established in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247
US. 179 (1918), the return of capital is not subject to income taxation. Thus, taxpayer argued that
since he had received his exact capital contribution on redemption, this was a return of capital not
properly includible in income. The Supreme Court did not deal with this argument, which,
subsequent to the instant decision, has become the basis for a petition to rehear. Respondents'
Petition for Rehearing at 1-2, United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
8. Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
9. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
10. 1INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 301(a), 316(a).
11. Subsection 302(a) sets forth the general rule that certain redemptions enumerated in
§ 302(b) may properly be characterized as a sale or exchange of such stock entitled to capital gains
treatment. Subsections 302(b)(2)-(4) contain objective tests whereby a redemption can gain
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payment in exchange for stock and taxed as a capital gain if it comes

within one of four categories in part (b). The first category is a
redemption "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." 1 2 This

"essentially equivalent" language first appeared in section 201 (d) of the
Revenue Act of 1921.13 This provision was an attempt by Congress to
eliminate tax avoidance devices" that arose following the Supreme

Court's ruling in Eisner v. Macombert" that stock dividends are not
taxable as gross income. Subsequent revenue acts retained the
equivalency language and broadened its coverage to all redemptive

distributions.16 Since there was no statutory definition of dividend
equivalency, courts applying the equivalency test resorted to varying
criteria. 17 Initial judicial interpretations limited the effect of the

provision to prevention of tax avoidance schemes, 8 and therefore, a

legitimate business purpose usually qualified a redemption for capital
preferred treatment if it is substantially disproportionate, terminates the shareholder's interest, or
involves certain railroad stock. Subsection 302(b)(1), involved in the instant case, allows capital
gains treatment where "the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend." INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 302.
12. Seenotes3, 11 supra.
13. "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the distribution of any such
dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as
to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent to the distribution of
a taxable dividend, the amount received in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as
a taxable dividend .... " Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228, as amended INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(1) (emphasis added)14. Many corporations developed a practice of declaring tax free stock dividends and
subsequently redeeming the dividend stock, allowing the corporation and shareholders to avoid
dividend tax treatment. See generally, B. BITTKER & J.EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

272-76 (2d ed. 1966). When § 201(d) was added to the

Revenue Act of 1921, Senator McCumber of the Finance Committee explained that the new section
was "for the purpose of preventing the provision relating to the exemption of stock dividends from
being used for a fraudulent purpose where the dividend is simply declared and then the stock is taken
up or traded back again in some way so that the stockholder will be free from the tax." 61 CONG.
REC. 7507 (1921) (remarks of Senator McCumber).
15. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
16. The Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(0,43 Stat. 255, made the test applicable to a
redemption of shares which preceded a stock dividend. The major change was made by the Revenue
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11,which required all distributions in redemption to satisfy
the equivalency test. This broadened test was included in the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,
§ 115(g), 47 Stat. 204, and incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. I, § 115(g)(l),
53 Stat. 48 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(1)). See BNA TAX MANAGEMENT
MEMORANDUM

No. 13, at4 (June 29, 1970).

17. Factors often utilized by courts in determining dividend equivalency include: (l) bona ide
business purpose; (2) whether the action was initiated by the corporation; (3) corporate plan of
contraction; (4) corporate profits after the redemption; (5) substantial change in proportionate
stock ownership; (6) corporate dividend history; and (7) source of redemption funds. Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937,939 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
18. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935).
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treatment.1 9 Determination of whether a transaction was motivated by a
bona fide business purpose, however, often presented difficult questions
of fact.2 As a result, subsequent judicial emphasis shifted to an analysis
of the net effect of a distribution in determining dividend equivalency. 2'
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, n the Supreme Court approved
this "net effect" approach, however, in later lower court applications of
this test, two competing theories of equivalency developed. 2 Some courts
employed a "strict net effect test" that restricted inquiry to whether the
redemption had the same net effect as a corporate dividend.?4 Other
courts adopted a "flexible net effect test" that continued to permit a
bona fide business purpose to rebut an inference of equivalency. 2 As
originally proposed, the 1954 Code would have eliminated the confusion
surrounding the taxation of redemptive distributions by deleting the

"essentially equivalent" language and substituting objective standards

that had to be met for capital treatment. 26 When the bill reached the
Senate, however, the proposed section was found to be "unnecessarily
restrictive"27 and the dividend equivalency test was reinserted as section
19. See generally Mickey & Holden, Distributions Essentially Equivalent to a
Dividend-Understandingthe Equation, 43 N.C.L. REv. 32 (1964). Factors and circumstances
generally considered to be bona fide business purposes under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch.
1, § 115(g)(l) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(b)(1)) were: "(1) enabling the business to
operate more efficiently as a sole proprietorship or as a partnership; (2) the conduct of part of its
business under separate corporate form; (3) enhancement of its credit rating by calling in stock to
cancel stockholder indebtedness; (4) resale of stock to junior executives; (5) provision of a profitable
investment for an employees' association; (6) adjustment for a legitimate shrinkage of the business
following a fire causing a permanent reduction in productive capacity; (7) elimination of
unprofitable departments; or (8) contemplation of ultimate liquidation." B. BrrKER &J. EusTiCE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 275-76 (2d ed. 1966), quoting,
Treusch, CorporateDistributionsandA djustments: Recent Case Reminders ofSome Old Problems
Under the New Code, 32 TAXES 1023, 1037 (1954).
20. See Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935).
21. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("net effect" rather than subjective
motives and plans is essential criterion of "equivalency").
22. 325 U.S. 283 (1945) (effect, not form, is controlling).
23. Compare Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) andCommissioner v. Sullivan, 210
F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954), with Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 195 1), cert. denied,342
U.S. 817 (1952), andSmith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1941).
24. See, e.g., Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,342 U.S. 817
(1952).
25. See Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) (essentially pro rata redemption was part
of legitimate corporate purpose and therefore not dividend).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954). The objective standards in the House
bill are now §§ 302(b)(2)-(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See note 11 supra.
27. "While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may be redeemed at
capital gain rates, these rules appear unnecessarily restrictive.. . . Accordingly, your committee
follows existing law by reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption shall be treatedas a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1954).
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302 (b)(1). As finally enacted, the statute included both the new objective
standards and the equivalency test so that redemptive tax treatment

would remain dependent in part upon a factual inquiry.2 8 Not

surprisingly, the courts continued to disagree over the purpose and
scope of the dividend equivalency exception. 3 A number of courts

completely disregarded business purpose in determining dividend
equivalency,3 1 while a majority continued to give varying weight to
32

business motivation.
The 1954 Code contained another new provision that affected

determinations of the dividend equivalency of stock redemptions. The
House version of the bill included in its original draft the constructive
ownership or attribution rules now embodied in section 318(a).3 By
express provision, the rules were made applicable to the proposed section
302(b).34 The subsequent addition of section 302(b)(1) by the Senate,
however, raised the question whether the attribution rules applied to that

subsection. 4 Significantly, the dividend equivalency provision makes no
reference to stock ownership.3 6 The Commissioner, however, has
steadfastly maintained that the attribution rules are applicable in
28. Id. at 44.
29. Compare Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967) (business purpose
irrelevant), with United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) (business purpose may vitiate
dividend equivalency).
30. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225,230-31 (9th Cir. 1964).
31. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967), noted in 21 VAND. L. REV. 399
(1968) (business purpose irrelevant in assessing dividend equivalency); Hasbrook v. United States,
343 F2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965); Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957). Compare
Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967) (business purpose immaterial), with
Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962) (business purpose insufficient to overcome
pro rata distribution), and Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) (essentially pro rata
redemption was not equivalent to dividend since part of legitimate corporate purpose).
32. See, e.g.. Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964); Heman v. Commissioner,
283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958). Two circuits,
while allowing a showing of business purpose, require that the purpose relate to the redemption as
opposed to the issuance. See Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger
v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962). A single business purpose standing alone may
not dispel equivalency. United States v. Fewell, supra. See also the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the
instant case. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 US. 301 (1970).
33. Seenote4 supra.
34. The relevant part of the statute provides that the constructive ownership rules of § 318(a)
"shall apply in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this section." INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 302(c)(1).
35. See, e.g.. Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 729, 758-59 (1955). The Treasury Regulations initially made the application of the
attribution rules to § 302(b)(1) mandatory, but they now provide only that the rules should be
considered. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
36. See note 3 supra.
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determining whether a distribution is pro rata under section 302(b)(1), 37
and most courts have agreed. 3 A few courts and the leading
commentators have adopted the position that the rules should be applied
only when a significant community of interest between the shareholders
39
or the shareholder and the entity dictates.
In the instant case, the Court ruled that the plain language of the
statute required application of the attribution rules40 to dividend

equivalency determinations under section 302(b)(1),

41 making

the

taxpayer the sole shareholder both before and after the distribution.
Turning next to the taxpayer's contention that dividend equivalency
otherwise established might be vitiated by a bona fide business purpose,
the Court examined the legislative and judicial history of section

302(b)(1). Noting that the intended scope of the section was not free
from doubt, the Court, nevertheless, concluded that Congress in

enacting the section had rejected past court decisions that considered the
motive of a redemption relevant to the question of proper tax treatment.

The Court found instead that Congress had intended to limit the inquiry
solely to whether the transaction could be characterized as a sale.42 The
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955). This determination takes on added significance in
closely held corporations since the fundamental test of dividend equivalency is whether the
distribution is pro rata or disproportionate to stock ownership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b)
(1955); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 291 (2d ed. 1966); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
38. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Commissioner v.
Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th
Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d II1, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1962); Thomas G. Lewis, 35
T.C. 71 (1960). The leading commentators have also determined that the attribution rules generally
apply to § 302(b)(1). See B. BITrKER &J.EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND STOCKHOLDERS 292 n.32 (2d ed. 1966). Compare Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111
(1st Cir. 1962) (applied attribution rules to find shareholder's position did not change significantly),
with Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) (essentially pro rata redemption was not equivalent
to dividend due to overriding business purpose).
39. See Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962); Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C.
129 (1966) (ignored attribution rules and found no equivalency); Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35
T.C. 950 (1961) (family estrangement precluded equivalency); B. BITrKER & J.EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 272-74 (2d ed. 1966); Bittker, The
Taxation of Stock Redemptions andPartialLiquidations,44 CORNELL L.Q. 299 (1959).
40. Seenote4supra.
41. The Court reasoned that nothing in the history or purpose of § 302(b)(1) showed an
intent to limit the express language of § 302(c) making § 318(a) applicable to § 302. The Court
further noted that unless § 318(a) was applied to all of § 302, a taxpayer who failed to qualify
under § 302(b)(2) or § 302(b)(3) solely because of attribution rules might qualify under
§ 302(b)(1) because the redemption would not be pro rata. 397 U.S. at 306-07.
42. "In lieu of the approach in the House bill, your committee intends to revert in part to
existing law by making the determination of whether a redemption is taxable as a sale at capital
gains rates or as a dividend at ordinary income rates dependent, except where it is specifically
provided otherwise, upon a factual inquiry . . . .The test intended to be incorporated in the

1410

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

Court therefore held that since only a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation could qualify a
redemption for capital treatment under section 302(b)(1), the purpose of
the transaction was irrelevant to a determination of dividend
equivalency. Since the distribution in the instant case was clearly pro
rata, the Court concluded that the redemption of taxpayer's stock was
taxable at ordinary rates. The dissent3 contended that a distribution
motivated by a legitimate business purpose belied a dividend and
concluded that the majority holding effectively eliminates section
44
302(b)(1) from the Code.
While the Court in the instant case resolved the conflict over the tax
treatment to be given redemptive distributions that do not meet the
objective requirements of sections 302(b)(2), (3), and (4), the restrictive
test adopted hardly promotes clarity in corporate financial planning.
The decision discriminates unnecessarily against closely held or family
corporations and will probably substantially deter capital investments in
such corporations. The "meaningful reduction" requirement, in effect,
eliminates section 302(b)(1) capital treatment for redemptions by these
corporations and severely narrows the section's availability for any
corporate redemption, whether pro rata or non-pro rata. Since the focus
now is on the taxpayer's relative position before and after the
transaction rather than on what motivated the redemption, the closely
held or family corporation is denied utilization of the section by the
automatic application of the attribution rules. Moreover, to qualify for
capital gains treatment all redemptions must satisfy the "meaningful
reduction" requirement established, but not defined, by the instant
decision. The availability of section 302(b)(1) is thereby limited to those
substantial redemptions that will not satisfy the control test required
under section 302(b)(2). Even in these cases, the section will not apply if
the attribution rules make the distribution pro rata. Furthermore, since
a valid business purpose will no longer assure shareholders of capital
treatment for corporate redemptions, the instant decision will affect
business tax planning in two additional ways. First, it has the indirect
effect of encouraging the taxpayer to satisfy capital requirements with
interpretation of. . .[paragraph (I)] is in general that currently employed under section 115(g)(1)
of the 1939 Code. Your committee further intends that in applying this test for the future that the
inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not the transactionby its nature may
properly be characterizedas a sale of stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation." S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1954) (emphasis added).
43. 397 U.S. at 314 (Burger, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
44. The dissent asserted that such revision should be left to Congress. Id.
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debt, as opposed to equity, instruments45 in order to prevent income tax

treatment on the return of essentially capital investments. Secondly,
possible future extension of the Court's rationale deters utilization of
sections 346(a)(2)" and 356(a)(2) 47 of the Code, both of which contain
the same "essentially equivalent" language found in section 302(b)(1). It
is submitted that the Court elevated form over substance4" by concluding

that business purpose is irrelevant in dividend equivalency
determinations under section 302(b)(1). The taxpayer in the instant case
would undoubtedly have been entitled to capital treatment if the
redemption had occurred before his family obtained control or if he had
sold the stock to a third party and the corporation had redeemed it from
that source. Dividend equivalency should be determined by a careful
analysis of the entire transaction. Section 302(b)(1) and its predecessors

were designed to eliminate tax avoidance schemes by permitting factual
inquiry into whether a given redemption could properly be characterized

as a sale.49 This inquiry should not be precluded simply because the
redemption is pro rata or less than substantial, for the transaction may
bear all the indicia of a true sale.5 In addition, since the applicability of

the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) to dividend
equivalency determinations under section 302(b)(1) is questionable, 51

there should not be an automatic application of the attribution rules to
distributions in closely held corporations. A more desirable approach

would be to apply the attribution rules only where a sufficient
community of interest in the questioned transaction dictated, 52 such as

where a husband or father actually controlled his family's investments or
45. It has been suggested that in the future preferred stock itself might qualify as a debt
instrument under the factors set forth in § 385(b), which was added to the Code by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 68A Stat. 72, amending INT. REv. CODE of 1954
(codified as INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 385(b)). This provision may very well become a principal
focal point for such determinations in the wake of the instant case. See BNA TAX MANAGEMENT
MEMORANDUM No. 13, at 14 (June29, 1970).
46. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 346(a)(2) (relating to partial liquidations).
47. Id. § 356(a)(2) (dealing with boot in certain reorganizations).
48. Traditionally, courts have sought to avoid rigid acceptance of the form a given
transaction took and instead scrutinized the entire transaction to determine its substance for
purposes of determining the tax treatment to which it was entitled. "[S]ubstance and not form
should control in the application of tax laws. . . .Tax laws deal with realities and look at the entire
transaction... " Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663,666 (8th Cir. 1937).
49. See notes 27,42 supra.
50. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 291-94 (2d ed. 1966). See also Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (1st
Cir. 1962).
51. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
52. 21 VAND. L. REv. 399,406 (1968).
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where the taxpayer is truly a constructive owner of another person's
stock. Thus, a more detailed "factual inquiry" to determine dividend

equivalency than the mere search for a meaningful reduction required by
the instant case appears necessary to effectuate the purpose of section
302(b)(1) and its predecessors of preventing tax avoidance. Such

examinations would prevent abuse of corporate redemptions while
allowing capital treatment for those motivated by a demonstrable
nontax avoidance purpose.

Torts-Unfair Competition-Material Misrepresentations

Enjoined in Suit of Advertiser's Only Competitor Despite Absence
of Trademark

Infringement,

Passing

Off,

or Product

Disparagement
Plaintiff, Electronic Corporation of America, sought to
temporarily enjoin the defendant, its primary competitor in the
manufacture of safety control systems,1 from distributing advertising
brochures that allegedly contained numerous misrepresentations. 2
Plaintiff contended that the misrepresentations were actionable because
customers who had normally purchased its product were now buying
from the defendant as a result of the false and misleading statements. 3 In
refusing to grant injunctive relief, the district court held that, despite the
presence of some misleading statements, 4 the plaintiff had no cause of
I. Plaintiff is a highly successful producer and supplier of a Fireye control system principally
consisting of an electronic programmer. Plaintiff's system provides an easy replacement procedure
that enables consumers to merely replace the programmer rather than install a whole new system.
Defendant reconstructed its own programmer so that it could be installed in plaintiffs system, thus
permitting defendant to compete in the replacement field. Defendant then proceeded with an
advertising campaign promoting the quality of its product. The statements to which plaintiff objects
were made in this campaign.
2. Defendant's brochure stated that the replacement procedure using defendant's product was
"an easy job . . . .No electrician required." Plaintiff contended that actually the replacement
procedure using defendant's product was difficult and required specially trained servicemen. The
brochure also announced that defendant's product was "[s]mall and relatively inexpensive, yet
[gave] full programming, . . .and many other features found only on much more expensive
controllers." Plaintiff contended that its product possessed all of these features and was less
expensive. See note 14 infra.
3. Plaintiff also complained of "the entire substance of defendant's activities." The court did
not consider this complaint except to hold that defendant's device could be marketed as a
replacement for plaintiff's control system. The court did not reach plaintiff's contention that
defendant's advertising violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1964), which holds a false advertiser liable to a civil action by "any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation."
4. The trial court found that the statement that "[n]o electrician [was] required for
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action without a showing of trademark infringement, passing off, 5 or
express disparagement of plaintiffs product.' On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. Material
misrepresentations made by a competitor in a two-firm market may be
enjoined when injury to the plaintiff is ascertainable, despite the absence
of trademark infringement, passing off, or product disparagement.
Electronic Cor. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 428 F.2d 191 (1st Cir.

1970).
Although at common law the right of a consumer to sue for
misrepresentation has long been recognized, the courts have been

reluctant to afford any protection to a businessman against a
competitor's false advertising. 7 Traditionally, an aggrieved competitor
has been granted a right of action only when there has been trademark

infringement, passing off, or product disparagement.8 The basis for this
doctrine was developed in American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw

Manufacturing Co.,9 in which the Sixth Circuit held that a competitor
does not have a private right of action unless he can show more definite

damage resulting from an invasion of his property right than a possible
decrease in future sales revenue. Moreover, the court reasoned that to

allow such an action by a competitor who has suffered no definite injury
would result in overburdening the courts with suits by many other
competitors.10 Subsequently, an exception to this traditional rule was
established. In Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.," the Second
Circuit held that the sole manufacturer of an item that is falsely claimed
to be offered for sale by another has standing to sue the deceptive
advertiser. The court ruled that the traditional restrictions on a

competitor's legal actions depend on his inability to show injury and
replacement of old programmers" was misleading and irresponsible. The court held that the other
alleged false statements were directed to the general field of programmers, rather than to plaintiff's
product; consequently, they did not constitute false advertising.
5. "Passing off" is a term used to describe the act whereby a producer induces a buyer to
purchase his product by falsely advertising it as having been manufactured by someone else.
6. Electronic Corp. ofAmerica v. Honeywell, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1969).
7. See I R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES § 18.1 (3d ed. 1967); Grismore, Are UnfairMethods of Competition Actionable at
the Suit of a Competitor?,33 MICH. L. REv. 321 (1935); Developments in the Law--Competitive
Torts,77 HARV. L. REv. 888,905-07 (1964).
8. E.g., Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 US. 540 (1891) (trademark infringement);
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900) (passing off); H.E.
Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187,229 N.YS. 692 (1928) (disparagement). See Developments in the Law-DeceptiveAdvertising,80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1017-18 (1967).
9. 103 F. 281 (6thCir. 1900).
10. Id. at 286.
1I. 7 F.2d603 (2dCir. 1925),rev'donothergrounds,273US. 132 (1927).
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should not apply where a plaintiff is in a monopoly position because
injury in such cases is ascertainable. Other courts have since adopted this
rationale and also have held the doctrine in American Washboard
inapplicable when a plaintiff has a virtual monopoly. 12 Although these
traditional limitations on competitors' actions have been continually
criticized by legal scholars,' 3 and completely rejected by both drafts of
the Restatement of Torts,'4 no court has overruled them. 15 In response to
the hardships caused by these narrow restrictions, federal legislation was
enacted to police unfair competition practices. 6 It was thought 7 that
section 43 (a) of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 would alleviate the
injustices and hardships often caused by these traditional limitations. 8
Interpretation of this section, however, has not been uniform, and the
courts have been divided on whether the common-law rules govern the
section's application.' Consequently, the traditional limitations have
remained effectual, 20 preventing recovery for false advertising unless
,12. E.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 US. 125 (1947); Motor Improvements,
Inc. v. A.C. Spark Plug Co., 80 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 (1936).
13. See, e.g., Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 876
(1948); Grismore, supra note 7; Handier, Falseand Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22 (1929).
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761 (1939): "One who diverts trade from a competitor by
fraudulently representing that thegoods which he markets have ingredients or qualities which in fact
they do not have but which the goods of the competitor do have is liable to the competitor for the
harm so caused.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), breaks
even farther from the traditional doctrines by eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff's
product have the quality which the defendant falsely claims.
15. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888,907 (1964).
16. Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964). See note 18 infra.
17. For an excellent discussion of the legislative background and purpose of the Lanham Act
see Derenberg, FederalUnfair CompetitionLaw at the End of the FirstDecadeof the Lanham A ct:
Prologue or Epilogue?.32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029 (1957).
18. Section 43(a) holds any person who falsely describes or represents goods or services to be
entered into commerce liable to a civil action by any other person who believes that he is "likely to
be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1964). From this it appeared that actual false description or misrepresentation with regard to
defendant's own goods would be actionable under federal law without the necessary showing of
trademark infringement or passing off.
19. Some courts have held that the Act was intended to apply primarily to trademark
infringement and to codify the existing law requiring the traditional limitations on a competitor's
actions. E.g.. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951) (using name
of Mark Twain not disparaging or passing off); Samson Crame Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87
F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), affd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (defendant
misrepresents his store as being operated by unions). Other courts, adopting a more liberal
approach, have held that the traditional limitations are not applicable to § 43. E.g., L'Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (defendant using photos of
plaintiff's goods to advertise his goods); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Hoffmann-LaRoache, Inc., 180
F. Supp. 222 (D.NJ. 1960) (defendant advertising his goods as originating in a nonexistent specified
laboratory).
20. The traditional rule has been modified slightly by a few cases in which truthful users of
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there has been trademark infringement, passing off, or product
disparagement, or unless the plaintiff has a monopoly of the product
21
involved.
In the instant case the court found that the defendant's advertising
.brochure contained numerous misrepresentations that could have
detrimental effects on the defendant's competitors. 22 The court
emphasized that the effect of these misrepresentations could be properly
assessed only by analyzing the nature of the market in question. Noting
that the instant market was essentially a two-firm market comprised of
the plaintiff and the defendant, the court reasoned that since the buyers
in this market had the sole alternative of buying either plaintiff's or
defendant's product, there was an ascertainable loss of revenue by the
plaintiff resulting from the defendant's false advertising. Recognizing
that the traditional limitations were premised on the inability of the
aggrieved competitor to show injury, the court concluded that they were
not applicable and injunctive relief was appropriate.2?
The instant decision represents a slight, but encouraging, break
from the reluctance of courts to protect a business from the false
advertising of its competitor. By granting relief to a plaintiff who
competes in a two-firm market, the court has expanded the monopoly
exception. This extension is minimal, however, because actions for false
advertising in a two-firm market are similar to those in a monopoly
market. In each case, there are two parties and damages are similarly
ascertained. Nevertheless, the court's statement that plaintiff has a cause
of action where its injury is ascertainable could be interpreted to broaden
the application of its holding. Although a single business in a market
with many competitors probably cannot show the damage caused by a
competitor's false advertising, several injured businesses, bringing suit
commercially valuable, geographic terms have been entitled to enjoin persons who used those terms
deceptively. E.g., Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608 (7th Cir. 1898), cert.
denied. 173 US. 703 (1899) (all flour millers of Minneapolis had standing against a Chicago
wholesale and retail grocer).
21. See, e.g.. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 US. 816 (1947) (proof of actual diversion of the trade required); Smith-Victor Corp. v.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (no injunction since many other
producers in the field); Show Management v. Hearst Publishing Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 606, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1961) (false statements regarding character of defendant's own show not enjoined).
22. The court took notice of the fact that the defendant, after litigation commenced, withdrew
the original brochure and substituted "Minimal electrical changes required" for the disputed
language: "No electrician required." The court found, however, that an order was still required
since nothing had been done about the invalid price comparisons.
23. In addition to augmenting the monopoly exception to include any 2-firm market in which
false advertising would directly injure a competitor, the court abrogated the traditional requirement
that plaintiff's goods must have the qualities of which the defendant boasts. See note 14 supra.
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as a class under new Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
could present persuasive evidence that their interests as a whole were
being injured by a competitor's false advertising. In such a case, a court
could grant injunctive relief by following the rationale of the instant
court. Problems with this approach may arise, however, in determining
24
the number of injured competitors sufficient to constitute a class.
Although the instant court's decision may subsequently be
broadened by judicial interpretation, it is unfortunate that the court did
not take this opportunity to emasculate the traditional limitations on
competitors' actions. The court could have done this by deciding the case
on one of two grounds. First, the court could have molded the facts to
bring the case within the traditional doctrines. Although the court held
that there was no express disparagement, it could have reasoned that
plaintiff's product was actually disparaged since the invalid price
comparison caused by defendant's misrepresentations resulted in
plaintiff's product becoming less appealing to the buying public. Thus,
according to the traditional rule, the plaintiff would have had a cause of
action despite the nature of the market. Direct extension of this
interpretation would give all competitors whose products have been
made less appealing by false advertising a right of action against the
advertiser. Secondly, the court could have granted injunctive relief on the
basis of section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act.2 The plaintiffs
claim seemed to fall clearly within the statutory language "likely to be
damaged. ' 26 Precedents exist z' that support this interpretation, and the
legislative historys of the Act manifests a congressional intent to curb
fraudulent competitive practices of the type in question. It is submitted
that the foregoing interpretations should be adopted because the
increasing impact of advertising on today's markets demonstrates the
urgent need for a more comprehensive right of action for false
advertising. Although the instant court failed to take these important
steps, the small stride it did take gives some encouragement that the
hardships of the traditional rules will someday no longer plague the
injured competitor.
24. It has been held that as long as the group is substantial, a class action may be brought.
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). "Substantial" would probably be determined by
what percentage of the competitors in the particular market are seeking relief.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964).
26. See note 18 supra.
27. See note 19 supra.
28. See note 17 supra.

